

Integration and Generations in the Netherlands

Part I Report

INTI - Integration of third country nationals

European Commission

Project INTGEN



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Immigrant generations in the Netherlands – summary report, presented at the EU Conference ‘Integration Indicators and Generational Change, Berlin, 14-15 June 2006

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Sources

For the assessment of the immigrant generations in the Netherlands we have consulted two different sources.¹ The first sources consisted of all publicly available social indicators and statistics, most of which were produced on a regular basis by the national statistical office CBS, the national social and cultural planning office SCP and other national offices since 20 to 30 years. These are available as series of annual reports, running (web-based) statistical data, regular publications, etc. The second source consisted of 21 interviews with experts in the domains of immigrant generation issues, such as labour market participation, integration and participation in society, education, youth culture, care for the elderly, etc. In addition to these sources we have surveyed the available research literature as much as possible, certainly in relation to the interviews and references as made during the interviews. In principle these sources should be sufficient for a meta-assessment of the chances and perspectives of the immigrant generations in the Netherlands, being my intended contribution to the INTGEN project.

Politics

There was, however, a major obstacle for the meta-assessment as intended. The assessment had to take place in a political context that is not well suited for an objective and impartial assessment. The immigration and integration issue has been one of the most controversial political issues of the country since 2001, in combination with an apparently full paradigm shift in politics and public opinion. The country that had the image and that fostered the image of an open and tolerant society towards immigrant groups and minorities appeared to have changed within one year into a country where ‘all’ were against multiculturalism, that was most restrictive on immigration issues and that required almost full assimilation of its immigrant groups and minorities. The change was announced by the writer Paul Scheffer in his newspaper essay ‘the multicultural drama’ (Scheffer 2000). It was directly followed by 0911 and Pim Fortuyn, both by his comet-like rise in Dutch politics in late 2001 and early 2002, as well as his assassination in May 2002, ten days before the national elections. In May and June 2006, i.e. in the months that I tried to synthesise the materials from my sources, the controversies had not settled down. They were even intensified e.g. by the possible expatriation of MP Mrs. Ayaan Hirsi Ali,² by the structural and undeniable labour market and probation place discrimination of young and second generation immigrants, and by a research publication on the rather undeniable racist, xenophobic and Islamophobic attitudes among large portions of the Dutch population (Ligtvoet 2006). In this context I feel a sincere hesitation with regard to the presentation of my assessment and conclusions, as they may be biased by personal pre-occupations with regard to e.g. multiculturalism, assimilation, forced expatriation and other sides of restrictive immigration policies, discrimination and racism, and Islam bashing.³

¹ Summary and discussion of: Muskens, George. Integration and generations in the Netherlands, Part I and II. Lepelstraat-EMZ, 2006 June.

² Today, i.e. in the early morning of 29 June 2006 one of the three government coalition partners in Parliament has formally ‘disapproved’ the actions of the responsible Minister of Immigration and Integration, Mrs. Rita Verdonk, together with most opposition parties. In the evening of the day the government has resigned, as this partner declared that it had therefore also left the coalition. The ‘immigration and integration drama’ in the Netherlands is to be continued, at least until new elections in early autumn. So, the Minister was also blamed by the national soccer guru Johan Cruyff for the bad Dutch performance against Portugal in Neurenberg on Sunday 25 June 2006, as she refused a Dutch passport to Salomon Kalou, who is a promising young player from Ivory Coast, playing for Rotterdam-Feyenoord during the last years.

³ I have applied three mechanisms that should keep me on a rather unbiased, impartial and scientific assessment of generation and integration issues. These regarded the survey of relevant policy documents, the selection of the experts and the ‘inverted assessment’. The latter was that I discussed first the most objective issues, i.e. those related to immigration research methodologies, then the ‘positive’ issue of the chances and perspectives of the young and new generation, and last the issue that is most difficult to assess, being the policies and policy shift in the Netherlands since 2001.

Indicators and statistics of 'backwardness' and failed integration

The publicly available social indicators and Dutch statistics could be sufficient and appropriate for the assessment of the integration of successive immigrant generations. It is a special characteristic of the Dutch statistical apparatus that an objectified parameter of ethnicity is used for each individual, and that the parameter is a combination of the country of origin and the generation to which an immigrant belongs. Further parameters are e.g. age, gender and place of living, among others. So, breakdowns are available of ethnicity, generation, age, gender and neighbourhood characteristics, on the one side, and integration indicators such as school attendance, school achievement, labour market participation, criminal involvement and further relevant issues as registered or surveyed on a regular basis, on the other.

Form the available indicators and statistics the following conclusions followed:

1. The average level of education among first generation immigrants in general and among those who arrived as 'guest workers' or as their marriage partners from the Mediterranean region is comparatively low.
2. It regards an aging generation.
3. Among the male part of this generation the labour market participation has declined from almost 100% to very low, without early retirement entitlements for most of them.
4. For the female part of this generation the labour market participation has been very low and has remained very low.
5. Consequently, a large portion of the aging first generation of 'guest workers' is dependent on minimal social security.
6. The fertility rate of these groups has been comparatively high.
7. Its dispersion has been low; they live highly concentrated in the cheap urban neighbourhoods, as urban poor, together with the aging urban poor among native Dutch people who could not follow the 'white flight' from the cheap urban neighbourhoods to new middle class cities and districts.
8. The second generation is comparative young, and therefore there are considerable interaction effects between generation and age.
9. The young and second generation has performed considerably better in education than the generation of their parents.
10. For certain groups such as the Indian-Dutch successor generations and the Surinamese women of Hindustani descent there is no difference with the same age groups among the native Dutch population.
11. For other groups the educational level as achieved is lower than that of the comparable age groups among the native Dutch population.
12. Unemployment among the young and second generation of immigrants is at least twice as high as among the young native age groups.
13. Criminal involvement among young immigrants is higher than that of young native groups, particularly among second generation Moroccans and first generation Antilleans.
14. In this sense, the conclusion appears to be that, apart from exceptions, of a persistent integration and 'backwardness' problem for the second immigrant generation.
15. A considerable portion of second immigrant generation from Morocco and Turkey is finding a marriage partner in their country of origin. In this way they may reproduce the same integration and 'backwardness' problem for another generation in the future.
16. As comparatively many young immigrants live with their parents or find a ('cheap') starters house in the same cheap district, the concentration of immigrants in cheap urban districts appears to be continued for a rather long period. Only slowly the 'best' immigrant groups such as young Surinamese families and 'integrated families' re-settle in new middle class cities and districts.
17. In general, however, the indicators and statistics also show that two-third to three quarters of the immigrant people in the Netherlands, be they first or second generation, be they male or female, etc., is to be seen as being integrated in Dutch society in terms of family life, education, labour market participation, non-involvement in nuisance and crime, etc.

The problem of integration policies

The latter point was sufficient reason for the Parliamentary Committee on failed integration and integration policies (Blok Committee 2004) to conclude that there was not really an integration problem. For the Committee the major problem regarded the obstacles against effective integration policies and measures (see also Koopmans 2002). Most immigrants became 'integrated' participants in society notwithstanding the ineffective or inconclusive policies and measures, e.g. in the field of education, language teaching and integration courses. However, both the interviewed experts and findings of targeted research have shown many more pitfalls of the indicators and statistics. I may refer to four points, although some more could be raised, e.g. with regard to the

neglect of the institutional context of blocked school careers or the non-take-up of care among aging immigrants. The four points are:

1. With regard to the most decisive issue in public integration debate the indicators and statistics are almost fully inconclusive. It regards the language non-proficiency that is said to prevail among newcomers and other adult immigrants, particularly among the first generation. Public assertions in this respect have made language courses and language testing the corner stone of the national integration policies since ten years, with new requirements introduced by the present government coalition. These regarded a language test before an entrance permit is allowed to an immigrant and a full language proficiency test for all first generation immigrants to whom this requirement might apply.
2. There is good reason to assume that the low labour market participation and blocked school careers among young and second generations of immigrants is caused by labour market and probation place discrimination. There is no reason to assume that the motivation and interest of young immigrants in successful vocational training would be less than that of their native counterpart, on the contrary (Severiens & Rezai 2005). There is quite some evidence and it is publicly acknowledged that young and second generation immigrants are frequently discriminated when they apply for a probation place or a job. So, the labour market participation is frustrated, and, as a consequence of probation place discrimination, successful school careers are frustrated: without probation no access to final examination and qualification. The issue then is not failing integration but discrimination and exclusion.
3. The criminal involvement of young immigrants does not stand without comment and public controversy. For instance, comparative court room analysis may have revealed striking differences between most immigrant and native defendants that appear to give a comparative advantage to the native defendants in terms of charges and punishment in 'equal cases' (Komen & Van Schoten 2006).
4. Most sincere expert critique of the social indicators and national statistics is, however, that they reinforce a rather negative standpoint towards immigrants or the immigrant integration. They are best suited for proving the 'backwardness' or failing integration of the first generation of 'guest workers' and their families, and the continuities between the first and second generation in this respect. They do not reveal the chances and perspectives of the young and second generations of immigrants, and it is to be doubted whether they could. From their methodology they reveal the past up to the present, and as far as the future is concerned it is restricted to strait-forward projections.

The national policy makers, particularly the representatives of the present government coalition, are apparently convinced of the 'backwardness' and the failed integration of too many immigrants, feeling confirmed by the objective indicators and statistics in this respect. As said above their major target is tested proficiency in Dutch as a second language for applicants of immigration visa and immigrant residents. The integration policies do not include priority targets with regard to the young and second generations of immigrants, beyond the aim of counter-acting educational 'backwardness' in general, some active employment programmes, e.g. in the frame of ESF or schedules for the reintegration of excluded groups such as long-term unemployed people, released detainees, etc.⁴

Chances and opportunities of the young and second generations

Most experts, however, focussed less on the 'problems' and 'risks' of the young and second generations, and more on their chances and perspectives of the young and second generations of immigrants in society. For most of them these chances and perspectives are undeniable. The chances and perspectives were to be enhanced, both in the interest of the young people and of society. In this frame they referred e.g. to role models among young and second generation immigrants, and to knowledge as derived from other research models and paradigms such as longitudinal research into time-cracks or qualitative research of cultural factors in ethnic relations or the analysis of good practices. Even the experts, who were appointed as high government advisers and commissioners e.g. for youth care and the employment of young people, Dr. Steven van Eijck and Mr. Hans de Boer, insisted on the urgent priority of youth policies and targeted attention for probation place and labour market frictions. For them the aging Dutch society cannot risk to lose its youngest generations, including the young and second generations of immigrants that are a serious part of it, certainly in the cities. So, their chances and perspectives are to be enhanced urgently.

Muslim perspectives

Beyond education and the labour market further urgent attention is needed for the improved perspectives of Muslims in the Netherlands – the Netherlands being a non-Muslim country where the Islam is a source of threat

⁴ In practice, however, most schedules for the counter-action of educational 'backwardness' and many local ESF-projects regard predominantly target groups among young and second generation immigrants.

for half of the population (Ligtvoet 2006⁵), for cultural diversity and cultural change as appropriate in relation to the new groups in society, and for processes of radicalisation and involvement in criminal groups. With regard to the Muslim perspectives the debate will continue on Islamic institutions in the fields of education, health care, media, etc., in line with *pillarisation* as a model for the moderation of cultural and religious strain in society. Opponents refer to the possible cultural isolation of Muslims and other groups that could counter-act their integration in society (e.g. Scheffer 2006), while advocates expect that a process of cultural emancipation is encouraged under the protection of private cultural and educational institutions (Goudappel 2005).

Cultural diversity and change

With regard to cultural diversity and cultural change experts referred, among others, to two mechanisms that certainly deserve attention, both in research and policy. First is the interest of many young people belonging to a successor generation for the cultural roots of their parents, grandparents, etc. Opportunities for roots search are to be enhanced, including the search for dark pages of Dutch history, such as the involvement in slave trade and exploitation, colonial history etc. (Bijnaar 2002). Second is the development of new mixed cultures in the cities that appear to reflect a joint culture for a wide variety of young people of native and immigrant origin. The term for it is the *urban culture*. It is receiving public attention e.g. in the projects of the new cultural institution in Amsterdam South-East *Imagine Identity and Culture*, as a positive perspective following from migration and cultural change. It reflects grass root multiculturalism.

Radicalism and crime

Last point of attention in the present summary assessment regards the sometimes extreme and extremist action of young and second generation immigrants against their (new) society and its norms or values. It is known as Islamist extremism or radicalism, on the one side, and comparatively high involvement in organised crime and juvenile nuisance, on the other. Beyond all differences between religious extremism, organised crime and juvenile nuisance, in actual policy debate since 2001 these three are usually taken together, with the rejection of integration in the new society as the common denominator⁶ as far as immigrant youth is involved or is assumed to be involved. Immigrant representatives as well as a number of other experts have made clear objections against the assumption that there is a clear relation between the age and generation indicators of immigrants, on the one side, and the alleged involvement in crime or Islamist extremism. Objections regard, as said above, among others, the judicial factor that may cause more and higher involvement rates among immigrant youth (Komen en Van Schoten 2006). These also regard the very small numbers of Islamist extremists and the comparatively small portions of immigrants groups that are actually involved in hardcore crime and persistent nuisance. In quantitative terms the knowledge base is restricted. The knowledge base refers mostly to qualitative research, such as ethnographic interviews and life history analysis, or on impressions of (privileged) observers. Both a recent publication on Islamist extremism (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy 2006) as well as one on immigrant 'loverboys' or young pimps (Bovenkerk and others 2006) had to rely on a very limited number of ethnographic interviews, as was underlined by the authors. In public debate these are sufficient proof for further allegations on the extremism of young Muslims and the criminal involvement of young Moroccans and Antilleans. So, 'they' are a new generation of scapegoats, risks and threats for the decent Dutch citizens.

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⁵ Newspaper publication based upon a Motivaction research project. The report has not yet been published so far. I received a methodological note on the research project via the newspaper editor of BN De Stem. As far as I could assess the research project was reliable and valid with regard to its conclusions.

⁶ Occasionally it is observed that it regards young people, who have reached high scores on integration indicators, such as language proficiency (e.g. Bovenkerk and others 2004). Maybe a high level of 'integration' is needed for a successful career as a terrorist, criminal, pimp, etc.

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1 The assessment that is hardly possible

May 17th 2006 was the evident time mark that an assessment of Dutch integration policies is hardly possible. It is one day after the announced expatriation of MP Mrs. Ayaan Hirsi Ali.⁷ It is the day after four and half year contemporary history, in which migration and integration issues have dominated and polarised public discourse. It is sure that these issues will do the same in the time ahead, at least at short-term. It occurred since four and half year, i.e. since 0911, the comet-like rise of Pim Fortuyn in Dutch politics, his assassination, the obvious assimilation-oriented paradigm shift of the immigration and integration politics, the murder of Theo van Gogh, successive expatriation and immigration scandals, and now, the announced expatriation of MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali.⁸ While assessing the developments a researcher can hardly avoid to become permanently involved in political controversy and comment, and to let political standpoints prevail over distanced observation, critical analysis and unbiased conclusions. The latter is difficult under normal circumstances, but is double difficult in the ongoing turmoil of Dutch immigration and integration politics.

As to remain as distanced, critical and unbiased as possible I have subjected my-self to a number of self-correction mechanisms. These have become leads of my contribution to the comparative assessment on integration indicators and generations, as initiated by BIVS in the frame of the European INTI-programme, and as carried out in 2005-2006 in Germany, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands. These mechanisms are:

1. The collection, translation and summarising of a set of decisive documents with regard to the above-mentioned paradigm shift since 2001. For the preceding period the international research community can reasonably rely on Ching Lin Pang's contribution of BIVS's MIGPOL Book IV as published in 2002 (Ching Lin Pang 2002). It already announced the drama thereafter, introduced in 2001 by the essay of Prof. Paul Scheffer on the multicultural drama (Scheffer 2000). The important documents that I have excerpted, translated and summarised for the first INTGEN interim report were, among others, that essay, overviews and assessments of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, the report of the Parliamentary Committee on Integration Policies (Blok Report 2003), the policy papers of the Cabinets Balkenende I (2002-2003)⁹ and Balkenende II (since 2003)¹⁰, new integration legislation as proposed by Mrs. Rita Verdonk as the Minister of Immigration and Integration¹¹, the government's reaction on the Blok Report, etc. The collection is included in attachment 7, Summaries of relevant documents.¹²
2. Second correction mechanism was the careful selection of experts for the expert interviews. For this I could make use of a comparative Dutch advantage, being the institutionalised social indicators research

⁷ On Monday May 16th 2006 the Minister of Immigration and Integration, Mrs. Rita Verdonk, wrote that it is to be assumed that Mrs. Ali never has received citizenship as she has obviously applied for it on a false identity. The Supreme Court had interpreted the naturalisation law in that sense in a verdict against an Iraqi family. They had applied for citizenship using their Kurdish name that was forbidden in Hussein-Iraq at the time. Mrs. Verdonk stated that she had to conclude against the citizenship of Mrs. Ali on the basis of two days of research after a TV-documentary. In the night of May 18th she was forced by Parliament to re-open her investigations, with the suggestion to come to another conclusion in six weeks. Less than a week later the Minister stated that Mrs Hirsi Ali (or Mrs. Hirsi Magan) will remain Dutch citizen or that she will receive a new Dutch passport without delay.

⁸ To a certain extent, MP Mrs. Ayaan Hirsi Ali is one of the leading personalities in the paradigm shift, together with e.g. Mrs. Rita Verdonk, who has announced her expatriation. Mrs. Ali's political concerns regard the oppression of Muslim women in its many forms such as genital mutilation, honour revenge, forced abandonment and arranged marriage, in relation to her full critique of the 'backward' Islam, in her words as a Muslim apostate. For many, she is an Islam basher, but it is fully clear that her gender and integration issues deserve the full attention of all policy makers and civil society, as these regard practices and ideologies that are irreconcilable with the basic principles of civil and open society.

⁹ Coalition of Christian Democrats, conservative liberals and the party that was founded by Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated ten days before the elections of May 2002. The party won the elections. It fell apart after half a year, which meant that new election had to be held in January 2003.

¹⁰ Coalition of Christian Democrats, conservative liberals and more liberal liberals. The coalition holds a small majority in Parliament since then.

¹¹ Mrs. Rita Verdonk is a member of this government for the conservative liberals, without known political antecedents before her nomination. Since April 2006 she is running for the leadership of the party. In defending her expatriation of MP Mrs. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who also belongs to the conservative liberals, she was even not supported by her own party that she hopes to lead for the next elections.

¹² The attachments form a separate Part II of the present report.

on integration and generations (see chapter 2). I did not need to focus the expert interviews on the desirable set-up of indicators research and the arguments in favour or against it, as I could rely on official statistics, scientific literature and public documents. I could focus the expert interviews on 'remaining questions'. For national policies and debate I could restrict the selection to a few experts, who play obviously an important role. For them I had a number of remaining questions with regard to their arguments, policy perspectives and knowledge base.¹³ I have further selected a number of experts on e.g. local integration policies, youth work and risks related to young and second generation immigrants, as well as experts with a personal immigration background. They were able to relate their life and career experience to more general problems of integration, generations and research. The multiplicity of views and experiences would help me to take notice of the full range of problems and challenges related to the research objectives, and not to submerge in political comment.

3. Contrary to my colleagues I have reversed the order of the report. My colleagues have kept to the order that I would have preferred to follow too, would we not have been confronted with the severe political polarisation and strife. The preferred order is (new) integration policies, indicators with regard to integration and generations, research and further research. My reversed order is research and further research, indicators of integration and generations, and, finally, the new policies. With a first focus on research, i.e. on the position of the social indicators paradigm in policy-oriented integration research and the improvements as proposed by the experts, I could keep some distance to political comment and remain on the track of distanced observation, critical analysis and unbiased conclusions, as much as possible. Second point in the order is then the generation issue, whereas integration policy and its paradigm shift have become the object of the third chapter. Of course, all what is said on research in general and policy-oriented research in particular is intrinsically related to integration policy and the paradigm shift. However, from the perspective of research practice and research needs we can observe, analyse and assess the relation in a rather distanced, critical and unbiased way, taking into consideration that the indicators research is done on the basis of these scientific and professional principles. The latter was supported by the fact that the paradigm shift in integration policies was not accompanied by a clear paradigm shift in policy-oriented indicators research. Both the old and the new paradigm are served by rather similar research practices and annual reports on the state of the integration of immigrant individuals and groups.¹⁴ As far as changes have occurred these were predominantly technical and methodical. The methods and technicalities became more advanced, including Internet surveys, and virtual censuses. The generation issue that I will discuss in the chapter after that on indicators research also can keep to a more distanced, critical and unbiased view. This is the case, among others, because the generation issue regards the challenges, opportunities and concerns of young people in society, be they immigrants or native, although we will argue that it is not conceived from that perspective in indicators research. So far, however, I could remain rather distanced, critical and unbiased. On that basis I feel to be able to round up the contribution to INTGEN with the assessment of the integration policy in The Netherlands and its paradigm shift since 2001: what happened, why did it occur, and where is it expected to go to, as far as it can be understood from a contemporary perspective or from that of the experts with whom I had an interview.

¹³ It regarded the remaining questions to Prof. Paul Scheffer what his critique of multiculturalism means, to MP. Mrs. Mirjam Sterk what her expectations are with regard to integration tests before arrival, to MP Mr. Jeroen Dijsselbloem what he expects with regard to general education requirements for immigrants, and to Dr. Paul Tesser as the responsible policy adviser of the Minister on the relation between research and national integration policies. I had no direct questions for e.g. Mrs. Verdonk or Mrs. Hisrsi Ali in this respect, as they have clarified their standpoints sufficiently in publications, interviews, etc. Therefore, I did not need to approach them for an interview.

¹⁴ Later I will argue that the shift in national integration policies has not been as great as it was supposed to be in the political rhetoric of e.g. Verdonk or Scheffer, in the sense that national integration policies had already a rather strong aspect of assimilation in the preceding period.

I am sure that these self-correction mechanisms have helped me to remain on track. Nevertheless, often standpoints and observations, both on my side as on those of experts, are still mixed up. My standpoints I may clarify therefore here, in a few statements. These are:

1. The Netherlands has been an immigration country since many decades.¹⁵
2. The high efforts to restrict immigration and the forced repatriation of 'illegal' immigrants has had and will have many more negative consequences for society than positive ones.
3. The country needs a general pardon for all or most disputed permits of stay related to the old immigration laws before 2001.
4. The country needs new immigration legislation and practice based upon the immigration needs of the country and a chance for access for the present so-called economic asylum seekers and fraudulent marriage partners, i.e. by an open green card system.
5. The adaptation of the Dutch welfare state to the immigration condition is difficult. It needs a highest effort of long-term policy making to find a new balance between an affordable welfare system given, the entitlements of the aging population and the costs related to unproductive young groups at risk in society, including unproductive groups of younger immigrants.
6. Integration in its most comprehensive definition of full civic participation is a process that may need more than one or two generations. In that sense some patience on behalf of the receiving society is needed.
7. For most immigrants integration is not really a problem, as was shown by the Parliamentary Committee on integration policies (Blok Report 2003). They find their place and perspective in society.
8. As far as integration policies are targeted at more or less forced assimilation to native norms, values and practices beyond compliance to national and international law, they do violate the human rights of immigrants and immigrant minorities. Therefore they are to be rejected. Besides, they are counter-productive and lead to many negative consequences in practice. In this frame I am in favour of 'integration in the frame of recognised multiculturalism' (Muskens 2001, 2002) or 'integration with the maintenance of cultural identities' (Muskens & Extra 1996).
9. Integration policies that are targeted at the improved employability of young groups at risk in society, including unproductive groups of younger immigrants, are to be undertaken. In this sense, e.g. integration courses for 'employable young people and adults are to be seen as empowerment courses that are positive and useful for the individuals, even if they might have some 'assimilationist' implication.¹⁶
10. The practice of the obligatory integration courses as started in the Netherlands in the nineties needed far-reaching improvement, both with regard to the methods and with regard to the target groups. The methods had to be better adapted to the needs of the immigrants. Priority target groups should be those who are most open to empowerment and support, such as asylum seekers, singles, workers and parents in relation to the schools of their children (e.g. Muskens 2000; Task Force Inburgering 2002).
11. The 'improvements' of the present government are all but improvements, because they do not empower the immigrants. They increase the burden on the immigrants (costs, entrance examinations, infeasible procedures) and are targeted too much at the wrong target groups. The government's target groups include a number of groups that are far away from empowerment and employability. This regards in particular the so-called import-brides,¹⁷ who have to pass an entrance examination in the country of origin, and aged immigrants of the first generation.¹⁸

¹⁵ Since two years the country is an emigration country, i.e. a country with a negative migration balance. Even if this tendency will continue the country should take care of an immigration surplus in the 'employable' generations.

¹⁶ My credo: nothing against learning a language.

¹⁷ Import-brides are apparently a difficult target group of integration courses *after* their arrival (Muskens 2002), let alone then before their arrival.

¹⁸ Many of them have left the labour market or have been retired. Yet they should prove to be 'integrated' by passing an integration exam.

12. The best governance level for integration courses is that of the municipality, supported by national and European funds as well as national expert knowledge bases.
13. The expert knowledge should certainly include the knowledge of the indicators and generations as well as research in that field, although not as an exclusive or leading paradigm. Research and knowledge must also regard cultural factors as well as geographical issues.
14. Risk analysis shows that e.g. among young Antilleans and young Moroccans considerable numbers of young people are severely at risk. Therefore, special actions is justified and needed.
15. The unproductiveness of young groups at risk, including groups of younger immigrants, is certainly not only a problem of these groups and their members. It is as much or even more a problem of labour market discrimination, contra-productive school systems, lack of co-operation in 'white' governance and/or between 'white' institutions, as well as lack of expertise on the side of 'white' professionals and institutions. At this level it needs a highest national effort with regard to good and learning governance as well as good and learning practices as well as effective strategies and measures against broken school careers and non-access to the labour market.
16. Critique against religious fundamentalism and fanaticism is justified, including that of Islamic fundamentalism and fanaticism. However, Islam-bashing is unjustified and wrong.
17. The emancipation of immigrant women and certainly that of young immigrant women deserves highest political and civic attention. Too often oppression and violence against (young) immigrant women is observed that is apparently related to or that is said to be related to cultural practices. It may need special protection places and measures, the quick and easy dissolution of husband related permits of stay, and counter-information campaigns against arranged marriage, male domination, isolation of women, etc.

To my mind I take a rather moderate position in the ongoing national polarisation on integration policies. However, for opponents of 'multiculturalism' I may be identified as an 'extreme multiculturalist' and 'leftish believer'. The opposite is also true. Some immigrant and refugee caretakers find me to 'integrationalist' in my viewpoints. Now, however, I intend to 'go neutral' from here to the conclusions and recommendations following from the Dutch INTGEN contribution, summarising the data and the documents and giving the floor to the selected experts on integration and generations. Where I could not avoid my interpretations of the data, documents or expert opinion I have given my comments preferably in footnotes.

2 Dutch research

Research into the social indicators of immigrants' integration is not the only paradigm of Dutch research into immigration and ethnic relations. To a certain extent it is a dominant paradigm, particularly in policy-oriented research and research on behalf of governmental assignment. Most researchers, however, are involved in research in which cultural factors prevail as determinants of integration and participation in society.

In this chapter I shall discuss first the foci, position and institutional embedding of research on the social indicators of immigration and integration. That is the basis for the Dutch contribution to the present INTGEN project.

The section is followed by a section on two other paradigms of immigration and integration research. In this way we will refine the outline of the foci, position and the institutional embedding of the social indicators paradigm. The other paradigms regards first the paradigm of social geography with its emphasis on geographical concentration and dispersion of immigrants in the country and its cities, and second the paradigm that offers an umbrella to the many and very diverse studies of cultural factors that are involved in processes of immigration and integration. The three paradigms together form the Dutch research frame as discussed in the present study.

Then we will continue with a rather detailed of research needs and perspectives as proposed by the experts who we have interviewed for the present study. It will show in particular what changes and improvements would be appreciated.

2.1 Immigrant indicators and the Dutch research frame

2.1.1 The indicators paradigm

The social indicators paradigm is, however, the dominant paradigm of policy-oriented research and research on assignment of the government and other authorities since more than twenty years. Apparently, the government and other authorities want to know what the integration rate is of the immigrants and the successive generations of immigrants. The need regards a continuous stream of annual reports based upon national registrations, periodical surveys and virtual censuses that would show in how far the integration aims have been reached and what the state of the art would be. In this frame special branches for integration surveys and reports have been institutionalised as part of the trend in the social sciences and in policy making to relate policies to social surveys and to the indicators paradigm. The trend found a strong foothold in the social sciences and policy making since the fifties and sixties, when the major institutes such as IVA and ITS for applied research were founded and the task of the national statistical offices CBS was extended into the sphere of social surveys and data.

The social indicators paradigm has been applied on immigration and integration issues since the seventies of the last century. For the interest we may refer to the following reasons:

1. The interest emerged in relation to the high numbers of immigrant workers who apparently were going to stay in the country, and social problems with regard to housing, income and education.
2. The latter measurement and quantification followed the interest in Dutch sociology in the social surveys and the social indicators approach. Representatives of the approach could do and liked to do the social surveys that were needed for the measurement and quantification of social problems among immigrant workers.
3. In social surveys individual deficiencies were measured and quantified, particularly on parameters that could be measured at the individual level, such as educational achievement, work, employment, income and status. Individual data were elaborated and analysed in a sociological frame by aggregating and comparing the data of different groups, such as class, gender, ethnicity, urbanisation, etc. In the sixties and seventies this paradigm was rather dominant in Dutch sociology in general and the sociology of education in particular.

As a result there was a social indicators paradigm in Dutch sociology, although the name was not often used. The indicators paradigm has continued to play an important role in applied and policy-oriented research on immigrants and integration since then. Its basics have been institutionalised and therefore it has not been touched decisively by paradigm shifts and fashions, as was the case with e.g. Marxist sociology, ethnography, multiculturalism or cultural studies, etc.

The institutionalisation was remarkable in three fields. First, the paradigm has been institutionalised in the national statistics, in which, contrary to all other countries in the world, a clear and objective ethnicity indicator was included since the mid-eighties. From that time onwards the national statistics that are published at regular intervals by CBS have included breakdowns for ethnicity in all relevant fields, together with breakdowns for other sociological characteristics such as age, gender, class, etc.¹⁹ Second, standardised national social surveys have been carried out on the major immigrants groups and their living conditions in comparison with native Dutch persons. These surveys have been repeated at a regular time interval of four years since the late eighties.²⁰ Third institutionalisation point regards the production of quantified meta-studies or annual reports since the nineties on assignment of the government and other authorities with regard to immigrants, integration, etc.

Apart from CBS the researchers to be mentioned in relation to the social immigrant indicators paradigm are, among others, Entzinger (*Allochtonen Rapport* 1989), Veenman (Dagevos, Martens & Veenman 1996; Tesser & Veenman 1997; Veenman 1996A; Veenman 1996B; Veenman 2000), Dagevos (Dagevos 2001; Dagevos et al. 2003; Garson et al. 2003), Koopmans (Koopmans 2002), Tesser (Tesser et al. 1995; Tesser et al. 1996; Tesser et al. 1997; Tesser et al. 1998; Tesser et al. 1999), and their institutes SCP (also Keuzenkamp & Merens 2005; Van den Maagdenburg 2004; Vroman et al. 2005), CBS (*Allochtonen in Nederland* 2004; *Jaarrapport integratie* 2005; Wittebrood 2006) ISEO (also Mertens & Weijers 2000), ITS and RISBO. For part of my work I can also be associated with the social indicators paradigm (Muskens 1997; Muskens 2000; this project).

The major, institutional knowledge bases that are available in the Netherlands with regard to integration indicators are threefold. First base consists of the *administrative records* of individual residents of the country, such as the municipal registration of residents GBA, school achievement registrations, labour market registrations (available jobs and registered jobseekers), and the police registration of the suspects of crime. These records are to be made available to CBS on a regular basis. The ethnicity indicator is deduced from the birth place of a resident or that of his or her parents. A resident is identified as an 'allochtone', when he or she is born outside the country or when one of the parents was born in another country. Difference then is made between 'western allochtones' being those from EU Member States, Member States of the European Economic Area, Member States of the OECD except Turkey, or Indonesia. All others are identified as 'non-western allochtones' or persons belonging to the ethnic minorities. The identification is made automatically. In the municipal record someone's place of birth, gender, age and neighbourhood are identified. National population statistics are produced mainly from this base.

Second base are a number of regular and wide surveys that follow partly a panel design (with replacement of lost participants)²¹. For CBS these surveys are:

1. Working population panel EBB. Permanent survey on the present and future position of persons²² on the labour market, since the seventies and last changed in 2000.
2. Socio-economic panel SEP. Permanent panel survey of individual welfare issues related to income, property, debts, work, housing, attitudes, needs, etc.
3. Income panel IPO. Permanent panel survey concerning sorts of income and income distribution.

¹⁹ The factor has even been retro-introduced on older files, enabling a number of population breakdowns since the fifties.

²⁰ All surveys suffer, unavoidably of a high non-response in general of 30 to 50%, and an extra non-response among ethnic minorities of 50 to 70% in total. By highest replacement efforts and great samples it is possible to correct the data for specific non-response effects, particularly for those related to ethnicity, by giving weights to the individual data as derived from group averages.

²¹ See our remark above on the response and representation problems and the solution as found in great samples and weighting procedures.

²² Fifteen years and older, not being an institutional resident (health, care, justice, etc.).

4. Permanent Survey Living Conditions (POLLS).

For further details, see attachment 1.

SCP is doing the following relevant surveys on a regular basis:

1. The survey on the social position and service usage among immigrants (SPVA, LAS) was set up by ISEO in 1988 for the first time to map periodically the social position and service usage of the four major immigrant minorities, namely Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean immigrants, as well as a sample of native Dutch persons. The survey was conducted in 1998, 1991, 1994, 1998, and 2002. In 2003 a similar survey was conducted among the major refugee groups, i.e. among Afghani, Iraqi, Iranians, former Yugoslavs and Somali. It regarded the same topics and questions, to a major extent. Since 2004 SCP has conducted a recent survey among immigrants living in an urban environment. It regards the surveys LAS 2004/2005. Target population are the inhabitants of the 50 largest municipalities of Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, Antillean and native descent.
2. Additional service usage survey (AVO). This is a SCP survey, hold once in four years since 1979 concerning the usage the population is making of a wide variety of social and cultural services in society, in relation to household and personal characteristics.
3. Time budget survey (TBO). This is a time budget survey, carried out by SCP once in five years, since 1975.
4. Immigrant women in political functions (AIP 2005). This an E-questionnaire addressed to the secretaries of the District, Municipal and Provincial Councils on the political participation of immigrant women in these Councils. All secretaries have been approached, around 50% has responded.

For further details, see attachment 1.

Since the early nineties relevant virtual census bases²³ have been construed by CBS, SCP, the research institute of the Ministry of Justice WODC and the expert centre of the national police KLPD. First virtual census was the so-called Social Statistical Population Base (SSB – Bakker & Putman 2003; Tesser 2003) It is an inter-linked base of the labour market survey EBB mentioned above and registration data such as those of GBA. Since 2004 the annual integration report was based upon this virtual census base. The second relevant virtual census is Social Statistical and Criminal Record Population Base. In 2005 the experts at CBS and WODC succeeded in making a link between SSB and the police registrations of KLPD (Nationale criminaliteitskaart 2004; Blom et al. 2005; Van Rijn et al. 2005). The new database appeared to be correct for 90% of the individuals. So, breakdowns could be made for e.g. ethnicity, generation, labour market position, education and involvement in crime and nuisance.

For further details, see attachment 1.

Most quantitative details with regard to ethnicity and generations in the Netherlands follow directly or indirectly from these bases and from the meta-studies and annual integration reports that have been published by SCP, CBS and others.

In retrospect I would say that the focus of the social indicators paradigm has been on the *employable immigrant*, i.e. the integration of immigrants is defined in relation to their individual employability, at least for persons in the working life cycle (able persons 18-65)²⁴ or in those that precede it (persons attending schools or courses such as integration or language courses). An immigrant or a descendant of an immigrant is said to be fully

²³ Censuses have been abolished in the Netherlands since 1971 because of the very high refusal to co-operate with the census among the population. The censuses were replaced by improved administrative registrations such as GBA, on the one hand, and wide national surveys as listed above, on the other. The virtual census is a combination of both. The registration data with regard to e.g. ethnicity, age, gender, family situation and district are linked to the survey data, enabling the researchers to improve their analyses.

²⁴ This is of course an outline of the research paradigm that neglects the many exceptions that are to be included for the many persons on whom the employability model is not applicable: senior and retired persons, disabled persons, adult persons who did not join the labour market because of private or family reasons. However, an adult jobless jobseeker on social security is almost per definition negative on employability and integration. Further, a family member who is apparently not able at educating and socialising the children towards 'employability' is also negative on integration.

integrated if he or she is employed according to his or her capacities. He or she is said to be in need of integration support and efforts if he or she cannot be employed according to his or her capacities. Immigrant groups, be they of the first or second generation, are said to be at integration risk if its employability indicators score lower than the national average or the average of native Dutch groups. Important points of measurement are school achievement, skills and capacities, language proficiency in Dutch, and work. Individual achievements should reflect the individual capacities such as an IQ or an EQ. These should also be improved by the usage of public intervention such as an integration or language course. Group achievements should be equal to the national average or it should climb in that direction in the course of time. Lower averages indicate a group-related 'backwardness' in the interpretation of the researchers.

2.1.2 Integration and generation indicators

Ethnicity is defined in close connection with generation in the Netherlands. The ethnicity marker of every resident of the Netherlands refers to both the country of origin and to generation. The country of origin is either the Netherlands, or in old terms "the European part of the Kingdom", or a Member State of the EU, or a western country, or a non-western country, following a specific list in that respect. The 'western countries' are the Member States of the OECD minus Turkey and Korea, whereas Indonesia is listed as a western country.²⁵

Residents whose place of birth was in a non-western country are registered as belonging to the ethnic minorities when they have been born there themselves or when one of their parents was born there. Those who have been born there themselves represent the first generation and those whose parent(s) were born there represent the second generation.²⁶

The Dutch ethnicity marker was introduced in the seventies and eighties for three different policy reasons. These are:

1. Authorities and policy makers, particularly in the field of primary education, needed an ethnicity marker that could easily be applied for the allocation of special funds for the intensified education of immigrant children – they might need intensified education because they were deficient in school achievements, both in the first and second generation.²⁷ Intensified education should improve their school achievements and their integration. For (almost) all immigrant minority children the schools received a head-sum that was 1.9 as high as that for a non-deficient native child.²⁸
2. As in most European countries it is rather difficult to identify the immigrant minorities, as most applicable indicators are 'wrong', fully or partly. Besides, terminology is questionable in the sense that being a 'minority' is associated and connotated with 'minor people' or with 'minorisation' as Jan Rath stated (Rath 1991). In practice, the Dutch authorities did not like to work with the nationality criterion (Dutch citizens versus citizens of other states and EU-third countries) as both the Antilleans²⁹, the people from the Moluccan Islands, Surinamese people with a Dutch passport and the naturalised new citizens could not be identified as immigrant minorities in this way. So, the many Dutch but not native

²⁵ So, the large number repatriates from Indonesia and their descendants cannot be identified as an ethnic minority. Until 1990 the people from the Moluccan Islands and their descendant were, however, acknowledged as an ethnic minority. In that year they received a major fund for the enhancement of their culture and interests, as a kind of redemption fund for the minority status. New immigrants from Indonesia are not listed as belonging to an ethnic minority.

²⁶ Those who arrived at young age and attended their primary school in the Netherlands are identified as belonging to the 'in-between generation'.

²⁷ The deficiencies have been measured and monitored rather regularly since the seventies. These proved continuous deficiencies among the first generation and remaining but diminishing deficiency among the second generation. The effects of intensified education have not been assessed in the same way, among others because the specific effects of intensified education were difficult to control and so to measure.

²⁸ Pupils have been 'weighted' since the seventies in this respect. Apart from the '1.9-factor' for immigrant minority children there was the '1.4-factor' for native children whose parents had only lower education. The present government has reshuffled the weights recently. It introduced a general '2.1-factor' for native and immigrants deficient children, but with a quota rule of the minimum number of deficient children per school class.

²⁹ In educational statistics that have been based upon 'nationality' for a long time the Antilleans could not be identified as a special group, although they were entitled to the 1.9 head-sum in primary education.

Dutch people belonging to immigrant minorities were difficult to identify. Also the making of the list that would differentiate between ‘western’ immigrants and ‘non-western’ or minority immigrants was uneasy on the basis of the nationality criterion. The applicable criterion became the place of birth and so the country of origin as registered by the municipality of residence, and the generation indicator could conveniently be related to it. The municipalities registered were father, mother and person have been born. Terminology became very special as to avoid the further usage of terms such as aliens, foreigners and minorities on the one side and that of native or Dutch people, on the other. New-speak became the term-pair ‘autochtones’ and ‘(non-western) allochtones’ since the late eighties.³⁰

3. In public integration debate life cycle related points, age points, and generation points play an important role. These are referred to with great regularity. So, there is the general expectation that the integration rate will increase over time and with successive generations, also because this apparently has occurred in most known immigration countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, or while it was forcedly enhanced in Israel until the later nineties. Arguments with regard to the failure of integration (see below) are found in figures that may prove that the integration rates did not increase sufficiently. There is also the regular reference to the opposite, namely that radicalisation and withdrawal from or opposition against Western culture would predominantly occur among the young and well-educated second generation of e.g. young Muslims. And it has been noticed that in the cities and urban districts youth crime is often committed or said to be committed by second generation immigrants, predominantly of Moroccan descent, or by young first generation Antilleans.

The life cycle related points, age points and generation points that play a role in public integration debate are however complex, particularly because age points may shift up and down the life cycle or life cycles of persons and groups. We have tried to make a start with the disentanglement of the complex for the present report. The result is attachment 2 to this report, in which both for minors and adults persons the following life cycles were distinguished:

1. The native life cycle, i.e. the general life cycle points of most Dutch people,
2. The immigrant life cycle, i.e. points at which the life cycle of most immigrants is obviously different from that of most native Dutch persons,
3. The housing life cycle,
4. The educational life cycle,
5. The social life cycle,
6. The judiciary life cycle,
7. The participatory life cycle.

We have related the life cycle points in each life cycle to the available sources of integration indicators, relying on the sources that were listed in attachment 1.

We may conclude that research on the social indicators of integration and generation is well organised and institutionalised in the Netherlands. Key elements of its organisation and institutionalisation are

1. The definition of ethnicity for official statistics and purposes as a mixed parameter of country of origin and generation,
2. National registration of ethnicity and other characteristics of residents of the country for statistical purposes,
3. Virtual census systems on social and judiciary issues,

³⁰ As far as I could reconstruct the terms were ‘invented’ by Han Entzinger and used consequently in the second report of the WRR on Allochtonenbeleid/Allochtones Policies (WRR 1989), of which Entzinger was the most important author. The term-pair kept its momentum in the country until recently. These days most participants in public debate feel as inconvenient as in the eighties in relation to the terminology concerning minorities, aliens, foreigners, etc. So far, a new pair did not arise, however. I have avoided the terms ‘allochtones’ and ‘autochtone’ in this report, as they do not refer to international debate. I prefer to speak of ‘native Dutch people’, western immigrant groups and non-western or minority immigrant groups, or to refer to specific groups and generations, such as young Dutch persons of Turkish descent, Alevi descent, Muslim descent, Kurdish descent, etc.

4. The large surveys that are periodically repeated on living, housing etc. conditions,
5. The annual reports on the state of immigration, integration, education, etc.

2.2 Other paradigms

2.2.1 Geographical dispersion and concentration

Another quantitative research paradigm in Dutch research on migrants regards that of the geographical and institutional dispersion and concentration of immigrant groups and the related phenomena of modern ghettos in the larger cities and social exclusion, on the one hand, and social isolation, intra-group marriage, closed cultures, etc., on the other. Names we would like to mention are those of Van Praag (Tesser et al. 1999), Latten (Latten 2003; Latten 2006; Latten et al. on www.cbs.nl) and, to a certain extent, Dagevos (Gijsberts & Dagevos 2005). The difference between this paradigm and the social indicators paradigms may be clear at the scientific level. The one regards a paradigm of social geography, with a touch of sociology in relation to social exclusion, and the other a sociological paradigm, with a touch of social geography in relation to the country of origin and the place of living. In debate the paradigms are easily mixed up with each other under a joint melting pot of e.g. 'integration problems' to be counter-acted and 'the backward neighbourhood' to be upgraded.

In this paradigm the implicit or explicit criterion for integration is the ethnic mix and equilibrium in a neighbourhood. Problems to be counter-acted are those that follow or appear to follow from ethnic concentrations and intra-group marriage, on the one hand, and 'white flight' from the weaker districts in the major cities, on the other.

2.2.2 Research on cultural diversity and multiculturalism

The most common scientific paradigm regards the cultural factors in ethnic relations. The Dutch ground of it is, among others, the ideology of pillarisation, which was a national model for the pacification of class conflict and religious strife between 1920 and 1970 (Lijphart 1968). Central idea of the model was that a high level of cultural autonomy within minorities is needed for the step-by-step emancipation of minority people as well as for the peaceful co-existence of ideologically opponent groups. The pillarised system functioned under the assumption that the minority elites make arrangements for the joint and national questions. On the basis of this model it has been proposed to encourage the development of e.g. Islamic institutions in the country (Rath et al. 1996). On the basis of experience with cultural diversity and minorities in other countries and regions such as the UK and Canada the 'multicultural paradigm' was reinforced in Dutch debate and scientific publications (e.g. Doomernik et al. 1996; Muskens 2001), at least until 2001 when the scientific council of the government WRR published its report on the Netherlands as an immigration country (WRR 2001). At that moment there were almost no new publications on immigrants and integration that did not have a strong cultural aspect, with e.g. a focus on immigrant minority languages (e.g. Extra & Peeters 2005; Kroon & Vallen 2006). It further included and still includes a long list of research projects and researchers on e.g. the functions of self-organisations (e.g. Muskens 1998; Van Heelsum, Fennema & Tillie 2004), specific groups from within such as e.g. Antilleans in the Netherlands (e.g. Van Hulst 1996; Muskens 1997;), globalisation from below (e.g. Kloosterman & Rath 2003), democratic participation (e.g. Michon & Tillie 2003), cultural practices (e.g. Bijnaar 2002), gender relations and ethnic gender oppression (e.g. Van Eck 2000), religion (e.g. Rath et al 1996), ethnographic studies at the borderlines of society and among criminal gangs (e.g. Van San 1998, Bovenkerk et al. 2003).

Before 2001, integration as such was not the most favourite research issue of the cultural paradigm. As far as studies referred to 'integration' most researchers made clear that integration was not to be understood as the adaptation of immigrants to a majority culture and certainly not as the forced or enhanced adaptation of them (Muskens 1996). Integration could refer to participation and inclusion, be it participation with the preservation of the immigrant minority's identity in the wider context of a tolerant and open society. In that sense it reflected

both the earlier approach of cultural diversity in the Netherlands and the pillarisation model, on the one hand, and the post-pillarised Glasnost of the Netherlands, on the other.³¹

2.3 Expert opinion – research to be done and extended

The experts we have interviewed for this report³² have assessed the state of the art concerning research on immigrant integration and generations in the Netherlands. They have outlined what themes and priorities, which theoretical frameworks and paradigms as well as which methodologies are most relevant for the future of research and policymaking. They have given their arguments in favour of certain points or against others. They offer a dynamic perspective on the existing paradigms. This chapter will give a summary of their assessments and arguments.

2.3.1 Further research on integration indicators and statistics

2.3.1.1 Practice and improvements

For the government Dr. Tesser's Directorate of integration policies is the contractor or co-contractor of most national annual reports on immigration and integration. It also shares the government's responsibility for the legislation with regard to the national statistics on ethnic minorities. Therefore, it is highly involved in the research field of social indicators on ethnicity, integration and generations. For the government the generation concept is not losing its importance in relation to its integration policies. It may be that education, work and participation will improve with generations, but it is still necessary to be informed about generations and integration and to set out integration policy aims and lines for a number of generation issues. Dr. Tesser referred particularly to the following issue. It is to be expected that there will continue to be intergenerational deficiency and therefore failed integration for specific groups, even beyond the second generation. It will regard e.g. school success and access or entrance to the labour market. Therefore, the government intends to introduce the third generation indicator in national population statistics, based upon the place of birth of grand-parents as to be able to measure long-term intergenerational integration effects in general and failed integration effects in particular. Two experts mentioned other points that would need improvement. The first regards the social indicator of the starters' qualification on the labour market, and the second the further specifications with regard to the country of origin.

The first point was raised in the interview with Dr. Severiens, Director of RISBO, the institute for policy-oriented research at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her research focus regards the new generation and the factors that make them successful in society or not. The essential question is whether they succeed to pass the starter qualification that is seen as a precondition for initial and prolonged labour market participation as adults in the advanced and knowledge based economy of the Netherlands. The concept of the starter qualification was introduced with the EU's Lisbon Declaration of 2000. For the Netherlands, the starter qualification regards the equivalent of middle-level vocational training during at least two years leading to a diplom, after either general secondary education during four years or preparatory vocational training during four years in combination with general secondary education. The level is indicated as that of short middle vocational training. However, national statistics do not offer ethnicity and generation specifications, in this respect.³³ Both local statistics, figures as

³¹ Since the seventies, pillarisation has disappeared almost fully from civic and political discourse in society, although it remained the major factor in the institutional and cultural management of society. The 'de-pillarisation' was strongly connected to the rapid and ongoing de-secularisation of the native Dutch population, of whom by the end of the century only a small portion could be registered as a Church-attending believer. The process of de-pillarisation was accompanied by a atmosphere of openness, easiness and convenience that can be compared with Gorbachev's Glasnost of the later eighties in the former Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe, to a certain extent.

³² See Attachment 3 for the list of interviewed experts, their selection, the interview topic, and the protocols of the interviews.

³³ However important the level is esteemed to be in relation to its civic effects and as the official starter qualification, it is not clearly represented in national statistics on school achievement. The statistics refer to the higher achievement level of full (i.e. four years) vocational training, with or without diplom, as well as to different short trajectories. They do not clarify and indicate those who passed the official starter qualification as defined above versus those who remained under it.

delivered by schools and the RISBO research project show that the participation of immigrant children in vocational education at the middle level has increased very much, particularly in major cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. It means that in a number of schools and sectors, such as care, welfare and economics, the majority of the pupils are now immigrant children of the in-between or second generation. It would be necessary to re-arrange educational and labour market social indicators and national statistics in such a way that the starters qualification would be measured and shown directly, and that it would be broken down for age and ethnicity.

Mr. Tuijnman, the integration policy adviser of the municipality of Rotterdam, raised another point. His problem was that national identifiers are far from clear as immigrant identity indicators. For Moroccans one should at least know whether the persons are urban and Arabic speaking Moroccans or Imazigh (Berbers) from the mountains. Actually, one should know the village of origin, its families and culture. The same applies to people of Turkish descent, with great differences between Turkish speaking people and Kurdish Turks or other minorities. Also among Surinamese people there are major differences between people of Creole, Indian, Moron, Hindustani, Javanese, etc. descent. Ethnographers have paid attention to differences like these, but it was only once applied as an indicator in a national report. That was the report of the Parliamentary Investigation Committee on organised crime in 1996. There was no follow-up on it, but the importance has not changed. To a certain extent it could be included in the national indicators, as these are based upon the place of birth of a person as well as that of his or her parents.

2.3.1.2 New integration indicators and statistics

In several interviews suggestions and proposals were made to introduce new and additional indicators and tables in the national and European statistics, in relation to policy needs and urgencies.

Dr. Tesser would be most interested could he dispose of comparable European benchmarks concerning ethnicity and generations, as these are available in the Netherlands. He is, however, aware of the objections from the other Member States against the registration and measurement of ethnicity. Therefore, he does not expect quick changes.

For local integration policies it is needed to know the population prognoses at the local level and to dispose of detailed local breakdowns with regard to integration and generation indicators. A municipality such as Rotterdam relies on a rather full-fledged statistical unit of its own that is able to produce the necessary prognoses and analyses, as Mr. Tuijnman said. For a middle-sized municipality with a relatively large number of immigrants such as Bergen op Zoom the conditions are much less favourable. It can only rely on a very good but small statistical unit that is to be involved in many different tasks. Therefore, the municipality depends rather much on the national statistics, Mr. van den Kieboom, alderman of integration policies remarked. These could and should give more and better details with regard to the backwardness and failed integration of immigrants, as far as it occurs, and with breakdowns for the local districts and wards. Partly this could also be a matter of usage and dissemination, as the relevant data might be available, but not in published reports or self-help and no-charge statistics.

For some European groups there are some obvious problems related to national reports and available statistics. Mrs. Garcia and Mr. Sittrop are continuously faced with an unsolved problem with regard to people from former Yugoslavia. Until 1998 persons arriving from there were registered as 'Yugoslavs', although the country had been dissolved since 1992. Therefore, there are mistakes in national and regional statistics, as well as repeated administrative problems with regard to the post-Yugoslav communities belonging to the association they represent and the communities affiliated to it. Their organisation does not have the means to correct the data, and they receive insufficient response among the government's officials who are responsible for the national statistics. So, the problem remained unsolved. Second, Dutch self-help and no-charge statistics has aggregated most EU-citizens, particularly South-European EU-citizens from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece in a wide category of 'further EU-citizens'. Therefore, for an organisation that is dependent on no-charge statistics such as

theirs it is hardly feasible to produce statistical breakdowns for the national groups that are represented by their association. Third, not available is the differentiation between refugees, guest workers, brainworkers and other status groups such as family re-unifiers. For their association the distinction between e.g. post-Yugoslav refugees and post-Yugoslav guest workers and their families is most relevant, and therefore they have pleaded for a clear indicator as part of the national statistics, until now without success.

2.3.1.3 Use and dissemination of indicators research

Many experts expressed their opinion that policy makers and 'integration managers' should dispose of detailed knowledge and statistics. For his field of youth care and custody Dr. Van Eijck, the youth commissioner of the government, stated that policy makers in the field should know very much and should give highest priority to their knowledge base concerning youth and youth care. Therefore, the registration, information exchange and youth policy monitoring are included in the list of priority aims of the Operation Young he is leading. The leaders of immigrant associations such as Mrs. Garcia and Mr. Pieters urgently need relevant and reliable data concerning their constituent groups and communities. Their associations do not dispose of the means needed for research contracts and assignments. They depend almost fully on national indicators as delivered by the national statistical office CBS, publicly available research³⁴ data and research work as done by their own staff or researchers on probation from higher education. To a certain extent, its needs are met by the self-help and no-charge package for national statistics STATLINE, but with obvious exceptions. On a number of points STATLINE does not offer the differentiations and indicators their associations would need, as explained above for the Southern European communities. With regard to the Antillean people in the Netherlands no distinction is included concerning the different islands, although one of them (Aruba) is an independent part of the Kingdom since the mid-eighties, three island are English speaking parts of the Kingdom, and the constitutional unity of the Dutch Antilles will be dissolved in 2007. The associations are insufficiently served.

The government has established a national expert centre for integration policies in 2004, called KIEM. It should encourage and reinforce the widest usage of publicly available knowledge on (young) ethnic groups etc.³⁵ Its quality is checked by feedback research. Until now, it has carried out on-the-spot surveys for all its expert meetings, and a series of interviews with its national partners in knowledge production and dissemination with regard to integration policies. From the feedback surveys on expert meetings it was concluded that the attendants used the meetings primarily as a forum for self-representation and the exchange of local experience, project plans, etc. Other functions, such as making appointments about further knowledge production and processing or finding indicators for successful policies and practices, might need improvement. For the website it was concluded that synthesising portfolios on topical issues were to be added to the news lines, short reports, and other reference materials. KIEM intends to let these synthesising reports be produced by the best experts in a field, in co-operation with KIEM as a good communicator. With the national partners appointments have been made about who will do what. Further feedback research is planned with regard to the usage of the website. It will be a qualitative assessment.

Mediation in the field is certainly needed, according to Mrs. Groenewoud, the leader of KIEM. There is a rather strong fragmentation of authorities demanding controllable knowledge of integration and integration processes, and there is increasing competition between research institutions. The relations with e.g. the press and other media of information are rather chaotic. Knowledge as produced is not finding its way to those who may need it,

³⁴ The outcomes of contract research as carried out for the government are not automatically publicly available. The standard research contract is a service contract, in which the contractor (the government, a ministry) decides upon publication or not. Research reports are publicly available when they are sent through by the government to Parliament. The Royal Academy (KNAW) has recently questioned this rule and practice, insisting on full and unrestricted availability of scientific knowledge, including research data and findings from contract research. Institutions such as LIZE and OCAN would be served with full and unrestricted availability.

³⁵ For its work, KIEM has set highest standards to its communications, and to its website in particular. It has received an international prize for aspects such as its accessibility and ease of use.

or it can be addressed to them in a distorted way. The production and dissemination of relevant information is served by KIEM as a specialised agent.

The centre was not well-known among the interviewed expert. Mr. Markadonakis, for example, did not notice so far that KIEM existed, although he laid high effort on the retrieval and dissemination of research findings.

Additionally, regional and specific expert centres could help policy makers, integration managers and professionals. Most expert centres related to specific immigrant groups have been established in the seventies and the eighties. Most have been dissolved since then. Mr. Pieters: “In the seventies and eighties a number of specialised units for Dutch-Antillean case work have been developed at the national and the regional level. They offered an interesting professional and expert knowledge base on the basis of practical experience, exchange of knowledge and the accumulation of expertise. However, apart from SWA, a specialised unit in Rotterdam, all have been dissolved in the nineties or merged into multicultural expert centres. With them, basic experience and expertise has disappeared. It is not really replaced by the multicultural or general umbrella organisations for immigrant case work, unfortunately.”

However, the major concern of local and regional centres such as e.g. Street Corner Work Amsterdam does not regard the publication and dissemination of scientific reports and monographs. They miss the discipline for that. Therefore, much knowledge disappeared with changing professional and political priorities, or is preserved in a rather informal way, namely in the heads of the elder and experienced staff. Unfortunately, until now no researchers have been seconded at a centre such as Street Corner Work Amsterdam, e.g. for writing reports and monographs on the specific groups street corner work has dealt with. And neither did local policy makers consult Street Corner Work Amsterdam on a more or less regular basis on its knowledge and experience with specific groups, as Mr. Kelderman, the Director of Street Corner Work Amsterdam, said. This is to be regretted, he said, in terms of usage and dissemination of relevant knowledge and experience. To a certain extent, professions such as that of street corner work have codified its methods and professional approach, as to help the new generations of professional street workers. The organisations offer probation places to high school students in the field. In this way part of the knowledge base is transmitted.

Dr. Severiens was dissatisfied with the response of policy makers and integration managers to the reports of her institute on immigrant dropout. She observed a low interest in ethnicity-related differentiations among local educationalists. Their first interest regards the educational process, i.e. class room interaction, curriculum development, teacher training, etc. Even diversity management and training is not an issue of priority concern.

2.3.2 Further research needs

The national and local policymakers we have interviewed expressed certain research needs. Dr. Tesser and Mr. Tuijnman referred to the interest in comparable European research findings. Mrs. Garcia, Mr. Pieters, Dr. Van Eijck and Prof. Scheffer mentioned their national research needs and interests. Mr. Tuijnman and Mr. Van den Kieboom have listed a number of local integration issues and subjects that should deserve targeted research attention.

2.3.2.1 Comparative research needs

Dr. Tesser mentioned that during the Dutch Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2004 his Directorate has been the active European contact point for integration policies. It has prepared the basic principles of integration that are to be applied in the EU. The principles were to be followed up by a work programme. The principles include a yearly national report of all Members States on integration, based upon a standard questionnaire.

Mr. Tuijnman referred to Rotterdam’s involvement in e.g. EUROCITIES and the Metropolis research programme. The interest is based upon the research questions the city has with regard to integration and integration policies. In this respect, the city would like to know what the state of the integration in other European cities is, preferably in relation to e.g. generation, gender, age, etc. Until now, most national and local statistical offices could not produce the data, mostly because of many national objections against the registration

of ethnicity. At the last Metropolis-meeting (Toronto, November 2005) the French Minister of integration has announced that even the French authorities now also want to know these data, in relation to the riots of autumn 2005 in the suburbs, and that they will change the rules that French statistics do not register the relevant ethnicity parameters. Mr. Tuijnman was very pleased to hear this.

2.3.2.2 National research needs

The major concern of Mr. Pieters with regard to national policy-oriented research is its independence and quality.³⁶ The government should assign independent policy-oriented research of the highest quality to independent research units and academic institutions. High quality research into the integration of young Antilleans at risk as well as academic research remained a scarce service until now, mainly because the research units are small, competitive and fragmented,³⁷ whereas the Dutch-Antilleans and their culture obviously did not offer sufficient body for full academic specialisation.³⁸ Mr. Pieters is convinced that independent policy evaluation research is directly at risk since 2002. The responsible department DCIM (Directorate for the Co-ordination of the Integration of Ethnic Minorities) has been moved from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, where it was linked to the Directorate-General of Immigration. The policy orientation changed from the general integration aims of social participation and emancipation to those of border and migration control as well as forced integration schemes. In this frame the government appears to contract in affirmative research and not independent research that he would be in favour of. So, the former government had ordered a study on shared citizenship and political participation in society on behalf of Dutch-Antilleans in the Netherlands. The study was assigned to an independent expert committee (Nèt loka falta 2002). A report like that one reflected that the Dutch-Antillean community was taken serious by the former government. It offered both to the government and e.g. OCAN good opportunities for 'responsible consultation', which is a matter of mutual interest and respect. The present government does not appear to be interested in this kind of studies. It also appears to be rather restrictive with the dissemination of research reports, e.g. as was seen with reports on the infrastructure of Dutch-Antillean communities and self-organisations in 2003 (Fermin and others 2003) or on possible good practices in 2005 (Heiberg and others 2005). So, for the moment he doubts whether he will find a response to his needs from the government, however justified his needs might be.

Mrs. Garcia was faced with a phenomenon of possible cultural isolation, i.e. a possible contra-indicator of social integration and inclusion. It regarded exclusive membership of own student clubs. She would be in favour of targeted research on the reinforcement of multiple identity among second generation immigrants and counteracting cultural isolation, would it occur. What, then are signs and indicators of real and dangerous cultural isolation, against harmless quasi-isolation?

Dr. Van Eijck has listed a number of issues with regard to youth care, communication and immigrant families. First issue regards the 'age of informal language learning'. It is known that children learn different languages including Dutch as a second language rather easily and naturally until the age of ten, under the condition that they are in (frequent) contact with peers and others, speaking Dutch. Beyond that age it appears to be much more difficult to learn a new language. Dr. Van Eijck would like to know how this point interferes with good communication strategies, i.e. with the implementation of general priorities of youth care. A second issue regards the specific anchoring points for effective communication with immigrant families and their members. Actually, it would regard research on the impact of cultural and family differences on the relations between mothers and children, with the aim to find the best anchoring points in the families for improving the chances and the opportunities of the children. It regards research into family dynamics. Last research priority Dr. van Eijck

³⁶ Also MP Mrs. Sterk insisted on unprejudiced policy-oriented integration research.

³⁷ Among these: DOCA Bureaus.

³⁸ One chair-holder in criminology has specialised on criminal involvement of Dutch-Antilleans, to a certain extent (Bovenkerk and others 2006); one dissertation on violence of young male Dutch-Antilleans (Van San 1998). There are two extra-ordinary chairs for Caribbean studies, i.e. the languages, history and cultures of Surinam, the Dutch Antilles and the wider Caribbean region. Since one year, the government has assigned a contract for a temporary expert centre with regard Dutch-Antilleans to KIEM. KIEM is the temporary governmental expert centre for ethnic minorities (see above).

mentioned regarded effectiveness of communication strategies, i.e. what factors are making the communication more or less effective in relation to this or that target group.

Prof. Scheffer has published a severe critique on the multicultural research paradigm. He also formulated a number of research priorities that are in line with his theory of immigration and integration, namely:

1. Immigrant family structures and practices: what is different and new; what has changed between the generations,
2. Mixed dating and marriage – thoughts and practices,
3. Mixed networks and mobility,
4. Straightforward and uncorrected data and analyses of spatial or cultural segregation, failed integration and the lack of upward mobility. Problem of most segregation research is that researchers and policy makers strongly ‘correct’ the data as to minimise their negative outcomes and consequences. So, in Amsterdam half of the immigrant children at black schools are excluded from the national primary school test as to avoid a negative outcome in terms of school achievement and school performance, compared to native children at white schools,
5. Ethnographic, in-depth research into what really happens in Muslim communities and families,
6. The economics of migration: what are the positive and the negative effects for the national balance; what migration is needed and desirable, e.g. in relation to the aging of society,
7. The importance of learning certain migrant languages for the Dutch economy as a whole, e.g. with regard to Arabic, Turkish or Chinese,
8. Economic and cultural investments of migrants,
9. Property and housing acquisition among migrants and migrant families.

Mr. De Boer of the Task Force Youth Unemployment mentioned very back-to-earth knowledge interests. First is: who are the 35.000 to 45.000 young people hardly nobody can find and can get on a successful track, what are their addresses, and who can find and bind them. Second knowledge need: what are packages and tracks that can successfully be applied in great numbers, recognising that the numbers are far beyond manageability via the tailor-made approaches and individual coaching. Mr De Boer said that he is not served by consultants and advisers, who insist on the tailor-made approach and coaching for each individual client, because there are many clients and too little resources to help them individually, both in terms of money and professional capacity.

2.3.2.3 Local research needs

Mr. Tuijnman is most interested in Entzinger’s coming report, expected in Spring 2006, on the attitudes of Turkish, Moroccan and Dutch young people. It regards their attitudes towards modernity, in the private and the public domain, and it should show in how far the attitudes have changed after 0911, Fortuyn, and the new integration debate in Rotterdam and the Netherlands.

Rotterdam is making population prognoses every three years. Mr. Tuijnman would welcome comparable prognoses at the national level and attention, both nationally and locally, for actual trends that differ from the prognoses.

Mr. Van den Kieboom has formulated a number of research needs and interests. He mentioned seven research needs that are not or only partly met by the existing local research infrastructure and knowledge base.³⁹

³⁹ The local research infrastructure includes a small statistical office of the municipality. In particular cases the municipality has concluded research contracts with a specialised unit such as DOCA Bureaus, the University of Tilburg, or applied research centres related to high schools, offering a research probation place. In some cases it has participated in national pilot projects, in case being one of the major stakeholders of research on the progress and the outcomes of the pilots. To a certain extent this was the case with a national pilots in the field of youth, ethnicity and crime (CRIEM schedule, 1988-2002) and the national funds that were available for integration courses for immigrants that had arrived before 2000 (so-called ‘oldcomers’), in the years 2001-2004. The final research output was rather meagre in both cases, however. Further, the municipality relies on the support of regional expert centres, such as the expert centre Palet for multicultural development. The centre is not a research institute but it mediates between the knowledge infrastructure and policy & practice in the municipalities. The centre has helped the municipality with the local debate on its integration policies with regard to its template, charring and report. Another regional expert centre is PON, the centre for community development in the province.

First need regards clear statistical data and prognoses. These regard the numbers of newcomers as well as first, second and third generation immigrants. Then, he needs to know what their level of participation in society is, in relation of political concern with 'backward participation': education, neighbourhoods, labour market, sports, culture, etc., and other integration indicators such as language proficiency. A similar level of importance for policy making regards the concentration and dispersion at the neighbourhood level, the trends and tendencies and the impact of new building schemes, e.g. in the frame of new neighbourhoods and neighbourhood renewal and gentrification. Next need regards extended management reports on the performance of departments and institutions. In addition, he would be interested in in-depth research into the (failing) match between offer and demand for many service and welfare sectors. What do immigrant groups and people need and is it different from 'white' demands; should departments and institutions be better adapted to the culture and demands of immigrant groups and people? What do the people want themselves and how do they appreciate the services that are offered to them? Is it feasible, would it be justified?

In relation to some specific policy fields Mr. Van den Kieboom would like to get answers on a number of in-depth questions, e.g. those with regard to the feeling of discrimination among immigrant group (is it real; what to do; how to counter-act labour market discrimination and discrimination on probation places), how is immigrant life developing under conditions of poverty, what is the impact of the care for families in Turkey and Morocco? What public provisions are vulnerable of fraud? What are the backgrounds of school dropout and what is to be done?

Targeted research on nuisance and crime in relation to effective prevention and repression is needed. So far, counter-acting projects and strategies reflect more 'incident management' than a coherent strategy towards mutual respect and better perspectives for full participation of e.g. the young Moroccans at risk in society.

Mr. Van den Kieboom would also welcome targeted research on immigrant women, focussing both on the success many young immigrant women achieve in society, in education and as professionals or spokeswomen, on the one hand, and on the isolation of many women of the first generation, on the other. Is the latter their choice and what are its consequences? Is it related to intergenerational backwardness for their children or not? Is it related to male family domination, violence, forced divorce and other practices we do not appreciate, on the contrary?

In relation to different images of the most important immigrant organisations in the municipality Mr. Van den Kieboom would like to understand the latent mechanisms of immigrant representation, e.g. from a comparative perspective on leaders and leadership, and on the activities that are to be organised by immigrant organisations in relation to their integration function, their interest-oriented mission, their profile with regard to culture and identity, etc. The municipality is interested in the integration function of immigrant organisations, first of all, and needs to understand the success and risk factors.

Mr. Van den Kieboom and the municipality have consulted it at some occasions. Further, the municipality expects departments and institutions that are involved in policy implementation to report clearly and regularly on progress and outcomes, using jointly agreed benchmarks. From the departments and the institutions he has received the management data, i.e. the figures on their clients in terms of input, throughput and output, in relation to e.g. age, ethnicity, gender, etc., since a number of years. Municipal departments that give relevant figures on a regular basis are the Social Security Department (poverty, social security take-up) and the Population Department (who are living in Bergen op Zoom, in relation to age, gender, ethnicity, mobility, neighbourhood; who have left, etc.). Further, regional institutions may specify figures from national and regional policy monitoring for the local situation. The latter is done by e.g. the Centre for Work and Income (labour market participation, social security), the Chamber of Commerce and ETIN for the economic sector, and the regional police district (suspects of crime).

2.3.3 The research response

2.3.3.1 The academic response

2.3.3.1.1 Two international research projects

Part of the academic response regards the leadership and participation in two international comparative studies on generations, young people and integration, apart from the present study. The first study is TIES and the second ISCEY.

TIES regards a comparative survey on the integration of second generation immigrants in 15 cities in 8 European countries, namely France, Germany, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden. The cities should represent immigration as an urban phenomenon in Western Europe. The cities are: Paris, Strasburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, Madrid, Barcelona, Vienna, Linz, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Brussels, Antwerp, Zurich, Basle, and Stockholm. The project has a focus on specific immigrant groups and their second generation, i.e. Turks, Moroccans and ex-Yugoslavs. Each national survey is targeted at at least two of these groups. In this way the comparative analysis and interpretation will be clear. From the earlier EFFNATIS study (second generations in Great Britain, Germany and France – see under) it was concluded that comparative analysis and interpretation was unclear, because different groups were studied in each country (Pakistani in Great Britain, Algerians in France and Turks in Germany). Therefore, it was unclear whether differences were to be explained by the groups or by the countries.

In each country second generation groups will be compared with a matching sample of native persons. It is to be tested whether integration differences (or the lack of difference) is explained by the country and its institutional arrangements or context grids for education, integration policies, etc., and by the school career of young people as reconstructed from the interviews. The integration will be indicated by factors such as school achievement, labour market participation and language proficiency.

Prior to TIES, European surveys on the integration of the second generation immigrants have been initiated by Bamberg University. The reports and publications included a country report on the Netherlands (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003).

The second study is ICSEY, being an international comparative surveys on the integration of second generation immigrants. It is done by an international research group of Prof. John Berry (Queens University, Canada), Prof. Paul Vedder (University of Utrecht), and others. In this study the focus is on psychological processes, i.e. on the process of acculturation, assimilation or cultural isolation. The outcome is seen as a result of individual and collective choice. The process is related to national diversity and integration policies as well as to the actual diversity of society. The studies have been carried out in colonist societies (Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, USA), post-colonial empires (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Great-Britain), and new immigration countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden). Major outcome is that those who can cope with *the best of two worlds* have best perspectives with regard to e.g. identity, relations, language usage, and cultural preferences (Berry, Phinnay, Sam and Vedder 2006).

2.3.3.1.2 Academic anthropology of the Islam and young Muslims

Among the interviewed experts only Dr. Sunier is full-time involved in academic work at one of the recognised Dutch universities. So, he is the only one to give a full academic response. His academic field regards the anthropology of religion, with special attention for young Muslims (Sunier). He would say that most research he is doing is rather eclectic by nature. Evidence is the convincing argument and dialogue. At the university students in the field of the anthropology of religion are to be trained for ethnographic field research. Their usual ‘apprentice and probation scheme’ includes half a year of preparation to develop their research proposal and the methods to be applied, followed by three months of fieldwork and three months for the interpretation. This

scheme is part of the curriculum for researchers in the field of the anthropology of religion at the University of Amsterdam.

2.3.3.1.3 *An Islamic university*

It is the mission of the Islamic University Rotterdam to build a bridge between the world of the Muslim believers and the non-believers. It was established in 1997. According to Prof. Akgündüs one finds the best conditions for the Islamic University and its mission in the Netherlands. The Dutch constitution allows the full recognition and financing of a religion-based university. So, the country includes protestant universities, catholic universities and a humanist university. The Islamic University Rotterdam expects to be recognized as a result of the procedure by the Dutch-Flemish Accreditation Board. It may claim that it has met already five of six conditions that apply. Weakest point is still the appointment of excellent scholars, but that remains the most difficult point as long as state funding is pending.

For its research projects an Islamic Research Institute is founded. It intends to carry out policy-oriented research on Islam in a minority setting, the status and function of imams in a non-Islamic country, and integration from an Islamic standpoint. It also intends to carry out law research on the Islam and human rights, democracy and the Islam, the rules of living according to the Islam in the “Land of Peace”, guidelines for Muslims about halal food, festivities, the interpretation of Islamic rules in non-Islamic countries, gender and Islam, etc. A third branch of the institute intends to carry out institutional and organisational research on school achievements of children from an Islamic background, the function of mosques in the Netherlands, the outlook on Islam and Islamic banking. Last research priority regards the intention to carry out history and art research on the artistic uses of Islamic calligraphy in Europe, on the relationships between the Netherlands and the Ottoman State, and on other issues in the field. In these ways the Islamic University will respond to the research needs of society and its Muslim community.

The university has not the full support of all Islamic groups and communities in the Netherlands, and it is faced with considerable opposition or scepticism from other groups and intellectuals in society. These opponents are against a ‘pillarised’ strategy towards integration – they prefer Muslims to submerge in general academic institutions.

2.3.3.1.4 *Scheffer: make an end to multiculturalism*

Prof. Scheffer represents a opposite academic standpoint, although he would agree that pillarisation has contributed very much to the pacification of earlier religious strife in the Netherlands and the emancipation of Roman Catholic and Orthodox protestant intellectuals between 1920 and 1970. He argued that the pillarised model and the multiculturalist paradigm cannot be the adequate intellectual and academic response to the challenges of immigration, the emergence of an apparent Muslim community in the country, and failing integration. Central issue in Prof. Scheffer’s approach of immigration and integration is his severe critique on the academic paradigm of multiculturalism. He has rejected this paradigm and its focus on diversity issues in relation to immigration and integration, because it reinforced the paradigm’s negligence of the modern and constitutional norms and values that should be shared by all members of a society. He had observed that this paradigm has become the dominant but false paradigm among most academics in the field since at least the sixties, and certainly among most Dutch academics. The focus of the paradigm was on the preservation of minority identities, including those that were against democratic norms and values or those that counter-acted their labour market integration and value. He found that multiculturalist research neglected the Dutch majority interests and values.⁴⁰ As a consequence, he concluded that the assumed added value and enrichment of culture

⁴⁰ He assumed too that these foci have been shared by the policy makers in the field of immigration and integration until he published his essay on the drama of the integration in the Netherlands (Scheffer 2000). Therefore, the challenged foci of the multiculturalist paradigm were copied by the policy makers, leading the criticised state of integration in the country. Also Koopmans had laid a connection between multicultural and pillarised ideology in Dutch politics and the lack of integration effects in comparison with Germany (Koopmans 2002). I think that the connection between the multiculturalist paradigm and

and society that should follow from immigration was unclear and should be doubted very much. Against the assumed added value and enrichment most indicators should show that immigration had made a clear material balance deficit in the country and that the cultural balance has become a balance at risk because of traditionalist family values and religious dogmas as hold by the majority of the Moroccan, Turkish and other immigrant groups. Most members of the first generation do not work, many of the second generation are alienated from society and the labour market, family practices do not encourage the participation of all in society, the Islam is not accustomed to being a minority religion in a modern and secular environment, etc. For him, it is too little enrichment that the national choice of food has been widely diversified.

In his theory of integration the central concept is the concept of citizenship.⁴¹ The concept refers to all persons who belong to structures beyond that of the family, such as a neighbourhood, a city, a country, a church, etc., and to its pertinent history. It is inclusive by its very nature and it rejects the exclusion or isolation of individuals and groups that could or should belong to the structure. In modern society citizenship refers to *democratic* values, as a consequence of the pertinent history of modern societies such as the Dutch one. As a consequence of pertinent history no group privileges can be acceptable, neither old privileges such as those related to status and descent, nor those related to protected communities such as certain religious groups. All groups and persons are to be handled in *equal* terms for the law. Further, as a consequence of pertinent history the modern Dutch society is also a modern *welfare* state. The welfare state and its institutions are to be preserved, notwithstanding the challenges of globalisation and mass migration. Then, the integration concept and policy should direct the attention of all citizens towards the need of shared citizenship by all at both levels: the adherence to democratic values and the protection of the welfare state.

Prof. Scheffer referred to three levels of operationalisation, being the level of social and economic achievement, the level of norms and values, and the level of reciprocity. Until now, the focus was too much on the first, i.e. on economic and social achievements, and too low on norms, values and reciprocity. But even with regard to the economic and social achievements the analyses and conclusions are to be criticised, whereas attention for decisive issues such as the direction of migrant investments (here or there) was absent as well as that for inter-ethnic contacts, networks and marriage. Prof. Scheffer stated that the history of immigration is the history of alienation. As a consequence of the alienation he assumed that double or multiple identities are very difficult for the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands with their backgrounds in the traditional agricultural zones of their countries of origin, and particularly for their children who are faced at home with their traditionalist parents and with modern life and education outdoor. The alienation is reinforced by the Islam as the dominant immigrant religion of the traditional peasants, because the Islam has great difficulties in accepting its minority place in the secular environment of the country of arrival. While it is almost impossible to 'moderate' the alienation of the first generation, something could be done for the children, although not easily. Therefore, it needs in-depth public investment in how to help the new generations. Much could be learned from the reports and protocols as available in mental health practice and research, dealing with immigrant families and the problems there between parents and children. All kind of socialisation measures are to be developed and tested, e.g. with regard to family support, educational practice, boarding and day schools. From a repressive point of view full law enforcement is needed against youth crime, as could be suing the parents for neglect or failing care and socialisation of their children.

As far as the economic and social achievement of immigrants and the continuity of the welfare state are concerned Prof. Scheffer has concluded that integration policy is served by strict and restrictive or selective immigration policies. The aim of immigration policies should not be to counter-act the aging of society. That would require hundreds of thousand immigrants per year and a population explosion up to 39.000.000 in thirty years. Those immigrants, who match with the economic and social needs of the country, are to be welcomed in

policy making has been rather distanced and that the connection between policy makers and the social indicators paradigm and the social geographical paradigm was and still is much more direct and influential.

⁴¹ It is also the key concept in the report of the scientific council of the government WRR of 2001 on the Netherlands as an immigration country (WRR 2001).

the country. At the moment there are only small and badly handled streams of immigration on behalf of the economic needs of the country, e.g. at the level of brainworkers. Immigration was a matter of accepting all those people who could not be denied access during decades, i.e. asylum seekers, Antilleans or others with a Dutch passport and family re-unifiers.

Equality for the law has gained momentum by the settlement of a large Muslim minority in the country. The principle states that the Islam and Muslims should have full freedom for the religion. The religion should accept, at the same moment, full equality for all religions and belief systems, including the acceptance of the 'deviant' Islam, i.e. that of Shi'ites, Sunnites, Alevis, etc, as well as the fundamental right of every person to abandon the Islam or to convert to another religion.

Actually, the confrontation with immigrant cultures and religions has faced the Dutch society with basic question such as what its dominant values are or should be and what basic equality for the law is meaning. It has reinforced the national quest for its canons and renewed the national debate on private and public education, i.e. the full public financing of religion-based schools (Scheffer 2006).

2.3.3.1.5 Insufficient academic response to indicators research

Dr. Severiens expressed a more practical concern in relation to the academic response. She thought that her findings and that of her institute for policy-oriented research with regard to ethnicity on the one side and success or risks at schools should receive academic attention too. As far as the findings would prove to be representative in the Dutch and in a comparative context they should be incorporated in grounded theories of immigrant children, generations, school achievement and labour market perspectives. In the Netherlands, however, the interaction between ethnic studies and the sociology of education never has been strong. Now, improvements are hardly to be expected, while the sociology of education has nearly died out. What has survived in the Academia is predominantly the psychology of learning and educational studies of learning processes. So, the input should come from ethnic studies, e.g. at the University of Amsterdam (IMES) and Erasmus University Rotterdam (Profs. Entzinger, Engbersen, and others). It did not come so far. However, recently her institute could welcome the secondment of a researcher from IMES for a meta-study on education and ethnicity.

2.3.3.2 The targeted research response

Targeted research has responded adequately to the research needs of policy makers and integration managers, to a certain extent. According to some experts the effective interaction with its stakeholders could be improved considerably, however. Mr. Markadonakis, who is a research specialist from ethno-marketing research, said that his research unit received a reasonable response to its press releases on recent and current research, on the one hand. So, it is an interesting means of dissemination and communication, and an interesting means to widen the horizon of the knowledge base. On the other hand, it cannot over-expose the media with its news and views because the media will rather quickly react that enough is enough. Therefore, Mr. Markadonakis is not fully satisfied with the public attention paid to the reports and data that are available. He mentioned several reports that were published and had shocking outcomes. Nevertheless, no wider public debate etc. followed.

Dr. Severiens said that the projects at RISBO e.g. on young immigrants and their career in vocational training schools are set-up and managed in an *interactive* way as to serve clients and stakeholders in the best way. It means that informants, users and other clients are consulted with regard to their existing knowledge of the problematic, their knowledge needs and their interests. They are offered a full opportunity to discuss the research outcomes and what they mean in terms of interest and policy perspectives. This interactive organisation of policy-oriented research is seen as a valuable side of research management, both by her and others in the Dutch research community. In this frame the reluctance among educationalists Dr. Severiens observed appears to be remarkable. As said, hardly no follow-up, directly nor indirectly, followed from their side, even not in terms of

the improvement of diversity management and training in the schools,⁴² or in linking up to recent policy initiatives with regard to the transition from school to work, probation places, dropout tracks, etc.

For her field of expertise Dr. Van San, who is doing ethnographic research on young immigrant offenders and criminality on several government assignments, appeared to be rather positive about the research conditions and response in the Netherlands. Contrary to the climate in other countries and research communities the climate in the Netherlands is rather open for research on ethnicity and crime. It is not hindered by feelings of political correctness since the government has asked attention for the relation between ethnicity, age and crime in a policy statement of 1998 (CRIEM Report). From experience she knows that the ‘political correctness factor’ is hindering a number of research initiatives and relevant knowledge that would follow from it in Belgium. In the UK a number of rules and standards against research on ethnicity and crime are strictly applied, with hindering consequences.

2.3.3.2.1 Targeted research priorities

Above we have discussed the research needs of policymakers, ‘integration managers’ and other stakeholders of policy-oriented research. Here we will review the priorities for targeted research that the researchers among the experts have listed.

Dr. Severiens’ first concern regards reliable and valid research, applying e.g. (sophisticated) survey research models, to be realised within the terms of contract. In relation to the research outcomes local immigrant spokesmen have expressed concern about ethnic pupils who are frequently and far above average refused for the probation places they need as part of their school term – and without probation no examination. The mechanisms would likely explain at least part of the high dropout rates among ethnic pupils, notwithstanding their high achievements and motivation. According to Dr. Severiens the mechanism and its consequences have not yet been investigated, but it should be a subject of highest priority.

Dr. Van San referred to the following priorities:

1. Crime and violence as committed by a number of Antillean youngsters,
2. Violence and verbal violence against homosexuals, as often done or expressed by a number of young Moroccans,
3. The ethnography of lover boys, young pimps and group rape, as observed from the side of a number of ethnic youngsters and gangs,
4. The criminal ethnography of new groups of immigrants, such as Somalis, Chinese, etc.
5. The causes of low ethnic crime, as statistically observed among Iranians and Ghanese people,
6. Female criminality and feminisation of crime, e.g. among a number of Antillean women,
7. Criminality among illegal residents in different countries and regimes, e.g. in Belgium and the Netherlands,
8. Reliable statistics with regard to crime and ethnicity at the European level.

MP Mrs. Sterk mentioned a need for more research on immigrant culture and the immigrant families, referring e.g. to a more journalistic set of interviews with ‘invisible parents’. It would require rather qualitative methods.

2.3.4 Further research methodologies to be improved

The discussion in this chapter has started with that on the social indicators methodology and that of national or local statistics. Then, we have discussed needs, response and priorities with regard to research. It may be clear that other methodologies and paradigms are to be applied in response to the needs. Social indicators and national statistics will remain insufficient in response to the needs and priorities. In this section we will discuss the other methodologies and paradigms that the experts have mentioned in the interviews. The methodologies regard (trend) surveys and several types of qualitative research, particularly the ethnographic interviews.

⁴² Another Dutch institute for education research, the Kohnstamm Institute at the University of Amsterdam, is developing models of improved diversity management and training for the schools, however.

2.3.4.1 Surveys on trends and trend-cracks

Mr. Markadonakis explained that his unit has developed formats and methods for ethnic marketing research in response to commercial contractors. The kind of questions to be answered were how 'parties' can communicate effectively with specific immigrant target groups. For its field work (interviews, group discussion, etc.) the unit has established and renewed a wide group of 'native experts'. For it, they have selected men and women of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean, and further immigrant descent, who can understand the people from these groups, both linguistically and culturally. They must, however, also be good in Dutch and they must have finished secondary education. They are trained for their assignments well and they are permanently controlled by senior staff while doing their fieldwork assignments.

From research management experience Mr. Markadonakis concluded that the public knowledge base with regard to (young) ethnic groups remained rather weak and one-sided, however extended it may be in comparative terms. It is predominantly based upon white approaches of white and centralised institutions. Informal knowledge of (young) ethnic groups and cultures remains usually rather low. Further, the sampling methodology is almost always based upon the dominant white family structures (small, two parents, two kids, one-and-half family income), and so sampling errors are unavoidable for ethnic groups with extended families or for those in which one-parent families prevail, as among Surinamese and Antillean families (with a female 'backup' of aunts, nieces, sisters and grandmothers). On the basis of the sampling errors one cannot expect to find the most reliable and interpretable data and findings. Then, most questionnaires with regard to social indicators and national surveys are highly standardised, e.g. as to characterise labour market participation, family positions, education and other indicators of status and ethnicity. Often the questions are unclear in the 'other' environment and therefore, they often lead to unclear answers and data. Example is the scaling of school and education as followed in the country of origin.

As a sociologist of culture and trend watcher Dr. Rohde explained that basic methodology must be the direct observation and participation on the spot. Therefore, Dr. Rohde has called upon a worldwide panel of 300 so-called 'cool hunters', and a European panel of 120. These are carefully selected reporters who report twice per year from their site on what is 'cool' there, obviously or presumably. Dr. Rohde has chosen 'coolness' as the term that should make the difference, and it is to be applied to fields such as cool places, cool people, cool products, cool brands and cool mentalities. 'Coolness' refers to feelings such as inspiring, attractive and with a potential for the future. The cool hunters have to explain why certain phenomena in their environment are spotted as being cool. This part of the methodology is rather idiosyncratic and eclectic, as the hunters work solo in their environment. Therefore, Dr. Rohde is most pre-occupied with the selection of the hunters. He has followed a model of self-selection, in which a fresh hunter is starting on probation and as a volunteer after application and selection, climbing up to the position of paid supervisor depending on his or her well-explained cool signs and trends.

For trend reports, other data and reports are included as well, as contributions to a meta-assessment of cultural trends and differences. So, the particular importance of the signs from all over the world with regard to the feelings and mentality of the generation groups is clarified. These are included and discussed in the frame of e.g. social indicators, opening up to the world of real life and experience. The methodology is vulnerable, however, while it remains dependent of impressions and uncontrolled observation. It is quite contrary to quantitative and objective research as applied by e.g. the social indicators school. As part of a wider set of methodologies to be applied for research on generations and integration its advantages are, however, obvious, Dr. Rohde would say.

2.3.4.2 Qualitative research

Dr. Bijnaar is involved in research on the cultural heritage of slaves and slavery in the Netherlands and its former colonies. For it, she has to rely mostly on oral history and open interviews. Other sources than the stories and memories of old people are hardly available, or they are distorted from the slave owners' perspectives. So, archives and documents regard the reports of slave traders and shippers, estate owners or court proceedings

against slaves accused of escape, violence, insurrection, etc. The sources may reveal some relevant points, but they are insufficient with regard to the position and perspectives of the slaves themselves. Literature from the time, paintings and remains may show a number of details, certainly when studied with a specific purpose, but they are not conclusive. Diaries are almost fully missing. Therefore, the researcher has to rely heavily on oral history and open interviews. These methods have to be applied with great precaution, however, according to Dr. Bijnaar, as memory can be distorted over time. The interviewed elder persons should be given the chance to be as realistic as possible and be stopped at points where imagination is taking over. The latter would give rather unclear and uncontrollable stories. Therefore, Dr. Bijnaar is posing concrete questions about things the elder persons still do know and remember, i.e. things that have occurred during their youth and childhood, not the things that might have been told to them about family members of earlier generations who have been slaves themselves. She also poses questions that relate to clear memories, such as the things around the house, the yard and other places of living. Then, she has selected people who have lived during their early childhood in former slave dwellings as they still existed on Surinamese yards in the twenties and the thirties, i.e. two generations after the Abolishment. These people still may have clear memories of things and practices as occurring in the places where slaves had lived. Thus, she was applying controlled qualitative methods for immigrant generation and culture research.

Another methodological control mechanism regards her phasing of research on gender and generations. For a new research project on male frustration she will not take the direct, but perhaps superficial way to reliable and controlled knowledge on gender and failed integration by breaking down integration indicators by gender and other parameters such as class and generation. She will neither start with survey research on male and female feelings of frustration with regard to labour market discrimination and other relevant issues. She intends first to focus on an orientation phase in the research plan in which she will hold in-depth interviews with selected male immigrants on what the feeling of discrimination and failure or opportunities and chance may mean to them. Further research should be based upon the in-depth insight in the meaning of discrimination, failure opportunities and chance.

For research on crime among immigrant youth groups and young people Dr. Van San followed, with other researchers, a new research paradigm and methodology in the nineties. This was the ethnographic approach. The ethnographic approach has stated explicitly that the criminal agent or offender takes an active role in criminal behaviour and in a criminal or violent culture. In this approach it is certainly not only the system or the culture that produces the criminals. Research, then, should focus on the clarification of this active role. Essential methodology is that of the ethnographic, in-depth interview. These are time-consuming interviews, but to Van San's experience time is not the problem. Offenders have time enough in the boring prison environment, whereas many offenders showed to be very interested and proud to tell about their life and actions. Of course, the researcher should not be astonished by the violence and aggression as shown by the offenders. Besides, as far as convicted offenders are concerned the record offers a fair level of control on what is said.

2.4 Research conclusions

Is it amazing that in the large Dutch research community so many and so different opinions exist on more and improved research on integration and generations and that academic leadership is obviously rather low in the field? I would say that there are actually one, or maybe two, clear and institutionalised research paradigms, the one being the social indicators paradigm and the other the paradigm of social geography. Both are well recognised as paradigms of policy-oriented research and receive regular assignments from the side of national policy makers, i.e. government and its departments. The social indicators paradigm appeared to establish itself as a strong academic paradigm too in the early nineties with the report on immigrants and integration of the scientific council of the government WRR (Alloctonenrapport 1989), and Entzinger's chair at Utrecht University.

Since then, however, academic competition has prevailed over academic coherence and leadership. I suppose that the study of the many possible cultural factors operating in ethnic relations is much more interesting from an academic point of view, whereas such studies may encourage diversity and competition among researchers and research groups. To a certain extent there is a distance between the cultural paradigms on the one hand, and the social indicators paradigm on the other. The distance is likely to be related to old controversy in the social sciences between qualitative and quantitative research, the cultural paradigm being more qualitative and the indicators paradigm being quantitative. It is also likely to be related to the old controversy between critical and affirmative research towards national policies and policy makers, the cultural paradigm representing critical research and the indicators paradigm affirmative research. This is certainly a caricature, but in terms of simple self-identification and labelling of the others it may work out in this direction. And it is certainly true that the indicators paradigm is rooted in the quantifying methodology of standard surveys and the analysis of secondary data bases and that it is carried out on government assignment, usually. Its further improvements and extensions follow the ideas and instructions of research directors of the government, such as Dr. Paul Tesser, as well as leading researchers at government agencies such as CBS, SCP and WODC.

It is, however, striking and an abuse of resources that much of the findings and results of indicators research remains insufficiently noticed outside its own circuits. The complaint of Dr. Severiens that the contradictory RISBO-findings on immigrants, vocational training and dropping out from school is justified and points at a severe problem. For policy makers the conclusion should be that the schools and its professionals should be better adapted to the needs and ambitions of young immigrants of the second generation, but they do not like to hear that. I had a similar experience with the conclusions of our assessment of actions targeted at Antilleans at severe risk in several municipalities. Some municipalities and institutions did not like to hear that their actions were not adapted to the target groups (Muskens 2005).

For academics the specific RISBO-surveys on ambitious young immigrants and broken school careers are not or not yet matching with their research agenda, although it should match with the aims of e.g. TIES. In one way or another these surveys as well as the other publications and reports following from the indicators paradigm should be used as important and to a certain extent decisive parts of comprehensive meta-studies of the country, its immigration, its ethnic relations, integration issues, generation issues, etc. Such meta-studies are pending.

Prof. Scheffer's statement with regard to the failure of the cultural or multicultural 'paradigm' is certainly too simple. It is based upon the assumption of a coherent multicultural paradigm that does not exist, on the one hand, and it denies the obvious cultural aspects of his own approach of immigration, integration and society, on the other. The paradigm is a kind of proverbial umbrella for a wide range of cultural factors that should explain the challenges of the Netherlands and its immigrants. Most researchers, who work under this umbrella, appear not to be in favour of forced assimilation as a policy objective, and therefore they may focus on issues that clarify cultural diversity and cultural markers of identity. However, apart from a few neo-conservatives among Dutch philosophers nobody is in favour of forced assimilation. Prof. Scheffer does not belong to those who are in favour of forced assimilation. As he said, assimilation can be an objective, but within the context of the Dutch constitution, canon and its history. The constitution has institutionalised the cultural and religious diversity of minorities, giving them equal access to national resources as available for e.g. education or social and cultural participation. This institutionalisation is the basic philosophy of the pillarisation of the Netherlands. Prof. Scheffer is in favour of full constitutional rights, privileges and responsibilities for all cultural and religious groups, including those that represent the culture and beliefs of important immigrant groups. Besides, he would never deny the colonial history of the country, and therefore the importance of non-European groups and cultures for the national identity and the national canon.

For him and for others the Islam is a special problem or a special challenge. Some, such as Prof. Akgündüs, would prefer to institutionalise Islamic research and education as a new pillar of Dutch diversity. So, relevant knowledge is to be pursued, from a scientific standpoint, whereas the further integration and emancipation of the Islam and Muslims in society is to be encouraged, as has been the case with e.g. the Catholic and Protestant

minorities of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Prof. Scheffer and others say that some or even many Islamists could abuse Dutch constitutional rights, privileges and responsibilities with other aims than pursuing relevant knowledge and/or the emancipation and integration of the Islam and Muslims. Research on the Islam in the Netherlands and its appeal on young and second generation immigrants appears to point at emancipation and integration effects (Rath et al. 1996; Phalet & Van der Wal 2004), but the findings were not decisive and were open to critique. In relation to the enormous impact of the Islam debate and the tendency towards Islam-bashing in public debate further targeted research on the issue is certainly needed.

I share the necessity of two other priority fields for further research that were mentioned by the experts. These regard trend and trend crack studies of new generations, with special attention for immigrant generations in the urban context. The other field regard ethnographic research and methodologies on special groups of young persons. It is a most promising methodology for elucidating unknown and unexpected aspects of young people, their motivations, actions, etc., under the condition that its major weakness is successfully counter-acted. In old – fashioned scientific Latin it regards the high risk of tertium-datur effects, i.e. research findings that reflect the researchers pre-occupations and mind set. The risk is very high and higher than in other social science methodologies as an individual researcher is making his or her own open interviews with ‘strange persons’. Dr. Bijnaar has shown that the risk can be reduced by the way that the interviews are prepared.

3 Immigrant generations in the Netherlands

Is immigrant youth the future, as all youth is supposed to be, proverbially speaking? Statistics and annual reports indicate in the best empirical way whether they are or not. In anticipation of the data to be summarised in this chapter and its accompanying documentation in attachment 6 and 7 I may say that the answer is not conclusive, certainly not in a positive sense. The data show, in very general terms, that some progress is made with regard to the integration, chances and achievements of the second generation compared to that of the first generation. However, young and second generation immigrants have lower levels of achievement and success than young native Dutch people, on the average. Besides, the number of them that is involved in (serious) crime is higher, in particular in certain groups such as young Antilleans and second generation Moroccan-Dutch persons. This was the conclusion of the government on the basis of its analysis of the data and materials as available (Cabinet's Reaction to the Blok Committee Report 2004).

The issue to be raised, however, is whether the statistics and reports are unbiased representations of reality. I would like to raise some points of doubt against the statistics and reports on immigrant generations, i.e. against the indicators paradigm as used for the assessment of the integration of immigrant generations in society. The data are presented and discussed first, however, without comment. The data regard overviews and data as relevant indicators of the integration or non-integration of young and second generation immigrants, i.e. data on:

1. The Dutch population and its young and second generation immigrants,
2. Proficiency in Dutch as a second language,
3. Education and qualification,
4. Participation in the labour market,
5. Geographical concentration and dispersion,
6. Criminal involvement.

Further to the summary of the data I shall discuss the relevant opinions of the experts on immigrant young people, their problems and chances. Special point of attention will be the expert opinions on identity issues in relation to the young and second generation immigrants as well as the impact of immigrant identities on cultural diversity and youth culture in general.

Directly or indirectly the points of concern that I will raise in the concluding paragraph follow from certain expert opinions, such as those of successful opinion leaders and researchers with an immigrant background.

3.1 Generations and integration as indicated⁴³

3.1.1 Population indicators

The Dutch population counted 16.3 million inhabitants in 2005. 19.2% or 3.1 million persons were immigrants of the first and second generation. The first generation counted 1.6 million persons, the second generation 1.5 million. The population has increased by 5% in the last ten years. The growth rate of both the first and second generation immigrants was 25%. In relative terms the portion of immigrants has increased from 16.1% to 19.2% in ten years. In that period the migration balance was 1 million for non-western immigrants.⁴⁴

There is high relation between generation and age among immigrants. For the second generation the age group of 0-15 includes almost 40% of all, whereas in the first generation almost 40% is 45+.

⁴³ For the data, statistics, graphs and overviews, see attachment 6 in Part II. Most data etc. are attached as links to Excel Workbooks.

⁴⁴ Recently CBS has revealed that the Dutch population showed a negative migration balance since 2003. The negative balance was 30.000 in 2005 (Latten & Nicholaas 2006; NRC Handelsblad 22-05-2006). The negative balance is exceptional for Western Europe. The negative balance is due to the very low immigration of asylum seekers and the moderate number of family re-unifiers since 2002, on the one hand, and the increasing senior white flight, on the other. Growing numbers of affluent white seniors have settled as so-called *pensionados* in the comparatively cheap border zones of Belgium and Germany as well as in Mediterranean countries.

In 2005 1.7 million non-western immigrants had settled in the country, namely 1.0 million of the first and 0.7 million of the second generation. The largest communities are from Turkish descent (358.000, with 196.00 of the first and 162.000 of the second generation), Surinamese descent (329.000, with 188.000 of the first and 141.000 of the second generation), Moroccan descent (316.000, with 168.000 of the first and 148.000 of the second generation) and Antillean descent (130.000, 82.000 of the first and 48.000 of the second generation). The other non-western immigrants are predominantly refugees with comparatively small portion in the second generation. The greater refugees communities have arrived from the following countries: China, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, Ghana, Egypt, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Pakistan, RSA, India, Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Angola, and Ethiopia.⁴⁵

3.1.2 Indicators of proficiency in Dutch as a second language

An obligatory integration courses is the most important measure in Dutch integration policies since 1996. The integration law of 1999 obliged all newcomers among non-western immigrants to participate in an integration course of 500 hours, to be attended during the first year after arrival.⁴⁶ Most hours are for learning Dutch as a second language. Further subjects are an introduction to Dutch society and orientation on the labour market. In 1998 the government opened a scheme for the municipalities to offer these integration courses for free to ‘oldcomers’, who are apparently in need of integration support in general and learning Dutch as second language. Recently a law has been proposed to Parliament to make a sanctioned integration test obligatory for all ‘oldcomers’, but the adoption is delayed because of implementation research that was found necessary by the Parliamentarian Integration Committee (Volkskrant 06-05-2006, see next chapter on the policies).

Until now output research on the integration courses is restricted to local targeted research (e.g. mine in Tilburg: Muskens 2000; Muskens 2002) and two annual reports published for the Ministry of Justice on the newcomers in 2002 and 2003 (Substantial report on 2002; Qualitative report on 2003). Until 2002 the responsible Ministry of Home Affairs has published a yearly monitor on the ‘oldcomers’ (Monitor oudkomersregelingen BZK 2000-2003).

3.1.2.1 Newcomers, 2002- 2003

1. 39.000 registered newcomers in 2002 and 30.000 registered newcomers in 2003; in 2002 were 25.000 and in 2003 were 23.000 obliged to attend an integration course.
2. Dropout has decreased over the years. In 2003 7% dropped out, most of them because of migration.
3. In the course of the 2003 45.000 newcomers attended an integration course; half of them started in 2002 (or earlier), and half in 2003.
4. In 2002 15.000 newcomers and in 2003 20.000 newcomers received a certificate of attendance. There is a steady increase compared to preceding years.
5. While 80% did not have any proficiency in Dutch at the start, this portion was diminished to 26% at the end, i.e. after 500 course hours.
6. The average proficiency increase was one level up on a scale of five. The target is, however, an increase of more than two points, i.e. an increase from no proficiency to social or even professional self-supportiveness in Dutch.

⁴⁵ There is a Cape Verdian community of 20.000 persons, mostly in and around Rotterdam. These are sailors and their descendants from Cape Verde, who were employed by Dutch ship-owners in the fifties and the sixties. They have made use of their right to de-embark in Rotterdam. Other special groups: the descendants of 12.000 Moluccan-Dutch soldiers and their 28.000 family members, who were repatriated from Indonesia to the Netherlands in 1949-1950, who still live in their ‘hometowns’ awaiting the Free Republic of the Moluccans (or South-East Indonesian Archipelago), and the Assyrian (Turkish) Christians, being a refugee community in and around Enschede of around 20.000.

⁴⁶ For refugees the start was after recognition as a refugee. During the asylum procedure integration is not to be encouraged, because it could give false hope and expectations.

3.1.2.2 Oldcomers, 2002

1. Around 600.000 to 800.000 immigrants may need to attend an integration course, while they may be deficient in literacy in general and in Dutch as a second language in particular.
2. 54 Municipalities concluded an agreement with the government with regard to integration courses to be offered to oldcomers.
3. In these municipalities 14.600 oldcomers started an integration course until the end of 2002. Special target groups were unemployed job seekers who could be obliged to follow a course, and parents (mothers) needing support for bringing and breeding up their children in the 'strange' Dutch environment.
4. Courses took mostly a half year or longer.
5. Most municipalities offered dual courses, i.e. combined tracks of alphabetisation programmes, language training and/or learning on the job.
6. Dropout was around 22%, for unclear reasons.
7. As far as measured and measurable the average proficiency increase was said to be one level, sometimes two.
8. An equal share of the successful attendants took vocational training as a follow-up or took a job.

3.1.3 Indicators of education and qualification: immigrant labour market starters at risk

Education at a glance (OECD 2005) and From school to work (OECD 2004):

1. In the Netherlands the level of school dropout among immigrant children (first, second and in-between generation) is high; considerably higher than among native Dutch young people,
2. Labour market chances of young immigrant people (25-29 years old) without school certificate (first, second and in-between generation) are much lower than those of native Dutch young people.
3. Both points together made the Minister conclude that most immigrant young people do have bad chances on the labour market (OECD 2005; OECD 2004; Volkskrant 14-08-2005).

The Minister of Education added to these OECD-data the following observations (Letter of the Minister of Education 13-09-05):

1. The achievements of immigrant children (second generation, in-between generation) in education are still lower than those of native Dutch children, but the achievements are better than those of immigrant children in the other OECD countries, on the average.
2. Dropout from school was already high in the preceding years, but it has again increased in the most recent period, and the age of dropouts has become continuously younger. Among the dropouts are comparatively many immigrant children who should attend the lowest levels of vocational training (p.3).
3. This is the more so as it appeared that the chances of immigrant youngsters (age 25-29) without a formal qualification have decreased compared to the late nineties and compared to those of native Dutch youngsters (p. 5).

Further data on the period until 2005: attachment 6.

3.1.4 Indicators of labour market participation

At the peak of the economic boom around the year 2000 it appeared as if the high unemployment among young and second generation immigrants had diminished that far that no special attention was further needed for it. At that point the young and second generation immigrants were almost equal to the younger natives in labour market participation. And the perspective was that the last differences would disappear in a short time.

The economic depression of 2002-2004 showed, however, that the young and second generation immigrants were much more vulnerable on the labour market than any other group, either in relation to qualification deficits

or discrimination on the labour and probation market. In general terms, the earlier conclusion of an integrated labour market for young natives and young or second generation immigrants was apparently not justified. Recent and earlier data are included in attachment 6.

3.1.5 Indicators of geographical concentration and dispersion

Most immigrants people, young and old as well as first and second generation, are living in the major cities and in the poor districts of the major cities, as it has been observed and reconfirmed in the annual immigration and integration reports since 1995 (e.g. Tesser et al. 1995; Gijsberts & Dagevos 2005). Inland migration, e.g. towards or from Amsterdam and Rotterdam is following other patters among young and second generation immigrants compared to natives (Feijten et al. 2006; Latten et al. 2006).⁴⁷

3.1.6 Indicators of crime involvement

Among immigrants, the National Crime Report 2004 (LKPD, CBS & WODC 2005) reported for 2004 more second generation suspects than first generation suspects. Immigrants were over-represented again compared to native Dutch persons, although the difference has diminished (Volkskrant 16-09-05).

For the data, see attachment 6.

3.1.7 Conclusion

Although the majority of the young and second generation immigrants is well or rather well integrated (Blok Report 2004, see next chapter) the data also refer to failed integration of a rather large number of immigrant people, including young and second generation people. The government stated the same in its reaction on the Parliamentary Committee. As an interim-conclusion we may refer to the government's reaction (Government's reaction 2004).

The government observed a deficit of immigrants including young and second generation immigrants on the following points:

- Around 500.000 immigrants of the first generation are insufficiently proficient in Dutch,
- More than 180.000 women of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean descent are kept in a position without perspectives in society,
- As an average, Turkish and Moroccan kids are still backward for two years at the end of their primary school,
- More than two third of the Turks and Moroccans do not reach a start qualification for the labour market,
- Young minority people are much better educated than the elder immigrant; yet, they 'under-number' the native Dutch with 20% with regard to their start qualification fro the labour market,
- The labour market participation is 15 % lower for ethnic minorities, on the average. For the youngest age cohorts it is even 36%,
- Social security is twice as high among immigrant minorities as among native Dutch persons,
- The majority of Turks and Moroccans of the second generation chose a partner from their country of origin,
- Inter-marriages between Turks, Moroccans and native Dutch persons were most often not successful; most ended as a divorce,
- For most Turks and Moroccans contact within the own ethnic group has been predominating,
- Immigrant young people are over-represented among the suspects of crime,

⁴⁷ For young natives coming to the major city is obviously related to higher education; they arrive at 18 and leave in large numbers after examination. The immigrants show to come and to stay. When they leave, they leave for less distinguished suburbs and surrounding small-town that the native population, on the average.

The greater majority of the immigrant minorities is living in concentration neighbourhoods with comparatively moderate living conditions.

So: maybe not a situation of full failure with regard to integration, but the immigrants and the country are certainly faced with problems and challenges, in the eyes of the government.

In the next paragraph we will discuss the opinions of the experts on the generations and the integration.

3.2 Expert opinions on generations and integration

We have asked the opinion of the experts on immigrant generations and specific groups of immigrant generations, either from their research position, their professional position or their personal experience, or from all of them. Major point of attention was the ‘new generations’ among immigrants, i.e. young immigrants and second generation immigrants. Further attention was paid to the first generation that has arrived some thirty or forty years ago (guest workers, Surinamese immigrants, Antillean immigrants) or even longer ago as is the case with the repatriates from the Dutch Indies – Indonesia after its independence in 1949.

A general theme in most expert interviews regarded the assumed tension between the integration of (successive) immigrant generation on the one hand, and the identity or identity markers by the immigrant groups and their members. They discussed this issue from two sides, namely that of the preservation the identity and old ties that is advocated by some and severely questioned by others, and the cultural change that can be observed among mixed immigrant groups in the cities, where apparently a special urban culture has emerged, with new ‘Creole’ and street languages, new signs of the time, new music, poetry, theatre and rituals, new styles and fashions, etc. The experts who mentioned the phenomena referred to it as a process of cultural change related to new generations, immigration and urban life. The current name of the culture is ‘urban’ or ‘urban culture’.

3.2.1 Expert opinion on the new generations

3.2.1.1 New generations from within

A number of the interviewed experts have made a full career as a member of the new Dutch immigrant generations. They were born here as children of immigrants (Mrs. Van der Linden and Mrs. Raat who both are daughters of repatriates from the Dutch-Indies⁴⁸), or they arrived at very young age with their parents in the Netherlands (Mrs. Madaya⁴⁹, Mrs. Garcia⁵⁰ and Mr. Sittrop), or they arrived here as a student or academic after youth and school in the Dutch Antilles and Surinam (Mr. Pieters,⁵¹ Dr. Bijnaar⁵²), where they had been familiar with Dutch as the language of education as well as with Dutch norms and values.

⁴⁸ As said before, in the fifties and sixties 300.000 persons were repatriated from the former Dutch-Indies/Indonesia. Most of them were mixed Dutch-Indies persons as the family of Mrs. Van der Linden is. Another group regarded mixed Dutch-Chinese families, who had lived in the Dutch-Indies/Indonesia for a long time. The Chinese minority was expelled from Indonesia in 1967 after the military coup against President Sukarno, and the families of Dutch-Chinese descent could be repatriated to the Netherlands then. The family of Mrs. Raat was among them.

⁴⁹ Mrs. Madaya arrived at very young age in the Netherlands. She is one of the few Moroccan Berbers with an academic career and position (head of school) in the Netherlands – most Moroccans in the Netherlands with an academic career and position are from urban and Arabic speaking families.

⁵⁰ Mrs. Garcia arrived in the seventies from Spain, joining the family of her father. As a young academic she became the president of the representative Spanish association and joined the board of the over-arching association of Southern-European immigrant organisations. On invitation she became its President and succeeded in the replacement of most board members of the first generation of Southern-European guest workers by young people of the new generations, who had been raised in the Netherlands.

⁵¹ Mr. Pieters is representing three generations of Dutch-Antillean relations. His father was one of the first higher civil servants of Antillean descent in the (former) colony. He himself was therefore socialised in a rather Dutch environment, including successive terms of stay in the Netherlands during early childhood in the privileged conditions of a higher civil servant on secondment. He arrived as a student in the Netherlands and stayed after graduation, because of a mixed marriage. He made a career as a professional manager in mental health services and interim management, and became the President of the representative association of the Antilleans in the Netherlands. The third generation he represents regards his daughter, who is attending gymnasium in the Netherlands. Notwithstanding the socio-economic position of the family, the daughter is registered in the Netherlands as belonging to an ethnic minority, because her father was born on the Dutch Antilles.

These persons function as a role model in society for the perspectives the new generations may have. They referred in the interviews to specific age and generation points that need attention, such as:

1. Young and second generation immigrants may have specific problems with their parents, i.e. with the earlier generation. To a certain extent, it may regard problems that are specific for immigrants, be they from the Mediterranean region or from other regions such as Indonesia. A specific problem regards differences in education. Most people in the first generation were educated at a low or moderate level, but many of them have put high effort on the education of their children. So, the number of highly educated persons belonging to the second and in-between generation is high (Mrs. Garcia).
2. The recent changes of public opinion towards immigrants and immigrant youth may have caused a certain level of uncertainty among young and second generation immigrants. They doubt whether they are welcomed or not, although they always have been members of Dutch society.
3. Actually, the brain and hands-on balance between the Netherlands and the Dutch Antilles is strongly positive on the Dutch side, Mr. Pieters explained. Of all grants awarded by the Antillean authorities to students for a study in the Netherlands only 1/5 or 2400 graduates returned. The other 4/5 or 9600 graduates have reinforced the higher segments of the Dutch labour market. Besides, a great number of persons, particularly women, have been recruited on the islands for work in the care sectors of the Netherlands, compensating for the shortage of hands-on professionals in the country. Apart from these recent and ongoing migration trends there has been the arrival of some 9000 young persons at risk (see below).
4. Many children from Dutch-Indies families performed well in education and at the universities. They also appeared to have great chances on the Dutch marriage and dating market by their appearance, manners and culture. Therefore, they had good perspectives in the Dutch society. Many of them, however, suffered silently under the family conditions related to repatriation. On behalf of their family ties representatives of the second generation have asked for public recognition of the pain and suffering of their parents. Finally, the government has accepted a historical assessment of the reception of the repatriates in the Netherlands (assessed as being a very cold reception) in the late nineties, and it has then decided to make an 'expressive gesture' to all who were concerned at the time. They received an after-payment of HFL 3000 (€ 1350) per person.
5. The Dutch-Indies third generation is a generation of choice. Part of them has remained interested in family roots, Dutch-Indies culture, etc. The interest appeared to have widened in scale and scope, however, as seen in the phenomenon of 'Asian parties' in urban weekend life, organised and attended by the third generation.

3.2.1.2 Education and work

Dr. Tesser, the head of research at the Ministry of Integration, referred to the research outcomes that the second generation is better integrated than the first generation, in general terms and for most groups. This regards education, work and participation in society. Second generation immigrants perform comparatively well as successful business starters, in particular the second generation of Turkish descent. At the same time, the averages of the second generation are still under those of the average native Dutch population of the same age. In that sense the second generation is still 'backward', on the average. There are, however, great differences between persons and groups. By and large, the second generation of Surinamese descent is fully integrated as was earlier the case with the later generations of Dutch-Indies descent. He expects that backwardness and therefore failed integration for specific groups will be continued between the coming generations, even beyond

⁵² Dr. Bijnaar lived as a young child with her family in the Netherlands, but returned with them to Surinam at school age, and studied sociology at the Anton de Kom University, Paramaribo. All education was in Dutch, as Dutch is the official language of Surinam. She arrived in the Netherlands for a post-graduate study at the University of Amsterdam, which she has concluded with her dissertation of the role of saved cash money (Kasmoni) in Surinam. After her dissertation she accepted a research position at NINSEE, i.e. the expert centre on the slavery past in the Netherlands.

the second generation. It may regard e.g. school success and access or entrance to the labour market. Its counter-action remains a necessity.

Mr. Hans de Boer, chairman of the national Task Force against Youth Unemployment,⁵³ referred to the economic setback that began in 2001. It had the highest impact on youth unemployment in general and among the ethnic groups in particular. Youth unemployment doubled immediately and that among ethnic groups increased with a factor three to four. The low unemployment rates that were reported for all groups of young people in 1999-2000 were followed by the severe new unemployment rates of 2001 onwards. The government reacted by including the counter-action against urban youth unemployment in its ESF-actions for 2003-2006, and by installing a special task force in 2003, among others. The government and he found that a great effort was needed for social reasons and as to avoid the negative consequences of youth unemployment (youth doing nothing and hanging around or worse), as well as for economic reasons: the unemployed young people would be certainly needed in the future in relation to the ageing of the national work force. The national economy cannot afford to lose its youngest generation. According to Mr. de Boer practice has learned that the general action lines are not enough to tackle all the problems. There is hard group of unemployed young people, who are difficult to find, to reach, to bind and to get on a track towards training and work. Mr. De Boer has concluded that it regards 35.000 to 45.000 difficult young people at risk. They hang around in society. Besides, there is a rather hard ethnic component in youth unemployment in general and in the latter group in particular. But also for the targeted action lines there is a clear ethnic component: lack of probation places, dropout from vocational training etc. Beyond all knowledge that is available in society concerning e.g. ethnicity and youth unemployment or beyond all good intentions with regard to all kind of local projects Mr. De Boer has concluded that the country would need additional strong and targeted counter-action. He followed in that conclusion the authorities in major cities and their alderman for integration and employment affairs in particular. With them he has launched the idea of obligatory work and schooling for all young people until 23. Young people are to be obliged to go to school and/or to work, in extreme cases via internships in special institutions or even camps.

For those who are willing to learn and to work he has proposed a set of integrated actions with regard to second chances at school-and-job combinations that should lead to (renewed) start qualification in two years for all participants, better access to probation places (no discrimination allowed!), information and acquisition etc. Further, role models should encourage jobless and under-qualified young people to follow their example towards a fine position in society. He will continue to give pressure on employers, employee organisations, the educational sector and all other stakeholders to co-operate with the task force to reduce youth unemployment, both among natives and among immigrant young workers, to the low level the national economy would need.

From the social and economic indicators it is also concluded that the (further) integration of the new generations is hindered by labour market discrimination. The discrimination is to be counter-acted, as MP Mr. Dijsselbloem stated: "The government should do what it says, and therefore actively counter-act discrimination on the labour market, e.g. by undercover teams." Leaving it as it is may reinforce tendencies among the new immigrant generations nobody would want, such as an attitude of solidarity with the badly educated bad boys, who are at the largest distance from the labour market.

3.2.1.3 Tensions

Dr. Rohde referred to the tensions that follow from the double or even triple cultures and identities of the new immigrant generations. It may regards the tension between (1) the family at home and the gratitude young people should feel towards their parents, (2) the school that is felt to be a boring nuisance, § and (3) the street that offers an attractive arena for fun and pleasure for young man, or as the attractive virtual street of sms, msn and other mobile media for the girls. The tension can be interpreted as 'challenges' for the new generations and

⁵³ The present position of Mr. de Boer represents his interest in full employment of all young people in general and that of young immigrant workers in particular. The same interest was shown by his successful action plan for finding 40.000 jobs for young immigrant workers in SME, in 1999-2001.

society, as members of the new generations and their role models do, as trends watchers say and as is the basic position of the ethno-marketing. In this respect Mr. Markadonakis said that on the market and in commercial communications age is more important than generation, whereas the lifestyle concept functions as a bridging concept between shopping behaviour and 'strong' background variables such as country of origin, ethnic identity and religion.

3.2.1.4 Young Muslim perspectives

Prof. Akgündüs, rector of the private Islamic University Rotterdam, said that the new and young generations of Muslims are faced with a lot of controversy in the Netherlands and in Europe. They must find their place and future. The university intends to lead them to find their way in confrontation with e.g. extremist tendencies and the rather anti-Islamic climate in the country. Prof. Akgündüs does not think that the students will be helped by straightforward counter-action against the extremist interpretations of the Qur'an. They are to be helped by in-depth knowledge and by living and working here, using e.g. Dutch as the national language and as the language of intercourse and debate. The rather anti-Islamic climate, then, is to be faced by integration and communication. The climate also requires that the students and the Islamic elite acquire the best and highest Islamic knowledge. They should not be hindered by 'ignorance' regarding how to behave in their social contacts. A hard and clear issue regards e.g. hand shaking between men and women. Most comments from the university are in the direction of 'no touching between men and women'. i.e. in a direction that is contrary to Dutch public customs. About many issues related to the Qur'an and the Islam the level of ignorance is high, both among the believers and among others in society. The university is organising weekly open debates on relevant issues, such as gender relations and the position of women in society, family life and socialisation, violence, terrorism, etc.

The university wants to include a professional school for imams, army imams, hospital imams, prison imams, Islamic teachers, etc.⁵⁴ It will offer clear career opportunities for the graduates of the university. MP Mrs. Sterk has stated that the course will be in the interest of young Muslims in the Netherlands.

Mrs. Madaya, who is the head of an Islamic primary school in Bergen op Zoom,⁵⁵ is convinced that the school is in the interest of the Muslim children of the new generation. The children are threatened by conflicts between their home and the religion as well as the culture at home on the one side and that of a secular or non-Islamic school and the wider world on the other. In this school the children are not faced with a conflict between their home and school. The school represents a moderate approach of life, school and religion. In terms of achievement it is to be noted that last year 13 pupils finished the school and went on: four to the higher level of secondary education, and nine to the middle and lower level. This year the number and level will be somewhat lower. The children were tested in the last two years for their further perspectives. Feedback from secondary schools reveals that the achievements of the pupils were rather good.

⁵⁴ For imams or 'moral guides' at institutions such as the army, prisons, schools and hospitals publicly financed positions are available, as these are also available for Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Humanists, Hindi 'moral guides', etc. A recognised curriculum for these positions would give the study a clear civic effect.

⁵⁵ There are 32 Islamic primary schools in the Netherlands. The number is not high, compared to number of Muslim children in the country and the freedom of education as laid down in the Constitution's Article 23. The number of schools and the number of pupils has hardly increased since ten years. There are two lines of opposition to Islamic schools, and a third mechanism that keeps the Muslim children away from these schools. First line is that of the adherents of public education for all – a number of socio-democrats and more radical liberals advocate the public school for all and want to make an end to subsidised private and religion-based schools. Second line is that of the opponents of 'creeping islamisation' of society, either because of fear or for the anti-democratic ideology of the Islam in general and Islamists in particular. This line is found among the conservative Christian Democrats and radical liberals. The third and most current mechanism is that of most Muslims parents, who do not prefer an Islamic school for their children, for whatever reason. Most send their children to a school next door, and not to the dispersed location of an Islamic school somewhere in the region. The Islamic school in Bergen op Zoom is small and stable in numbers. It recruits its pupils from its direct surrounding streets, the city and a wider region around the city.

3.2.1.5 Crime and radicalisation

The tensions are also said to be related to crime and radicalisation among a parts of the new generations, and particularly among a number of young Moroccans and Antilleans. We have consulted Mr. Kelderman, Director of Street Corner Work Amsterdam, Mr. Pieters for the Antillean youth, and Dr. Van San for ethnographic expertise on young immigrant offenders. Also Dr. Tesser has made relevant remarks on crime and radicalisation of young immigrants and the government's actions in this respect.

Mr. Kelderman referred to the expertise he and his organisation have built up on problematic immigrant groups during thirty years of practice. Usually, the attention of street corner work(ers) was focussed at the rather young age of adolescents, independent of the problematic of the group. The latter could be, for instance, drugs, radicalisation or troubles and nuisance as caused by young hangouts. First immigrant groups at risk that attracted attention were young and second generation Moluccans in the seventies. Some of them have committed a highjack or bombs attack in the seventies – among these one on the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam. Street Corner Work Amsterdam initiated a special project for this group. Street corner work also reached a strong trust and expert position among drug addicts, particularly among the (young) Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam in the years shortly after 1975, i.e. the independence of Surinam and the military coup a few years later. Since then, it has been a target group for street corner work and drugs teams in Amsterdam South-East, where most of them have settled. Most of them survived and still live in Amsterdam South-East, as elder and mostly very quiet junkies who are 'served' by controlled drug usage projects. Since the mid-nineties Amsterdam-West is said to be a Mediterranean city, predominantly inhabited by Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch people. Since then, Amsterdam-West is seen as the scenery of young Moroccan hangouts. Although the number of street corner workers that Street Corner Work is allowed to deploy in Amsterdam-West is very low in relation to the needs and urgency it has gained an expert position with regard to Moroccan hangouts on the street, their family relations (e.g. role of elder brothers) and their lack of perspective. For some the lack of perspective is followed by radicalisation and full rejection of the Dutch welfare state, labour market, etc. The radicalisation can take the direction of Islamism and self-made interpretations of the Qur'an, jihad, etc.⁵⁶ Street Corner Work has also gained a certain expert position on female aggression and violence as it occurred at schools and tramway stations in 'Mediterranean Amsterdam-West'. From their experience the street corner workers have developed the highest concern for prostitution and other forms of violence and sexual exploitation, e.g. by so-called lover boys (young pimps) among young undocumented and therefore illegal women, or other young immigrant women. The street corner workers are improving their trust and knowledge position among young Antilleans in Amsterdam South-East.

These Antilleans in Amsterdam and other cities are known as the young Antilleans at risk, i.e. the major target group of Dutch policies towards Antillean people. On them Mr. Pieters said that they have left the Antilles for economic reasons, without labour market qualifications and without a decent preparation for living and working in the Netherlands. They are vulnerable for organised crime. They are the proverbial no-future youth. The background is that the Colombian drugs economy has infiltrated the Antillean economy deeply. As easy travellers to Europe young Antilleans looking for easy money or for debts clearance can be seduced to become drugs traffickers with swallowed cocaine balls. With a Dutch passport they were easy travellers for all destinations in Europe. For organised crime, these traffickers are not the major smuggle line, but they keep customs, police and the judicature busy,⁵⁷ with the effect that the big deals remain hardly noticed. Although the crime statistics show that a relatively great portion of the young Antilleans in the Netherlands are involved in violent and drugs related crime, Mr. Pieters made two remarks. First is that the great majority of the Antilleans in the Netherlands is not involved in crime and they should not be blamed for the crimes of others. This occurred,

⁵⁶ Mohamed B., the murderer of Theo van Gogh, had followed this 'path of so-called self-enlightenment'. He had worked as volunteer in youth centres in Amsterdam-West, but radicalised extremely in 2003 and 2004, presumably together with a group that has been persecuted for forming a terrorist-criminal organisation (Chorus and Olgun 2005).

⁵⁷ They are so busy that persons who are captured with less than three kilos of cocaine on them are released awaiting further prosecution.

however, and it tends to alienate the Antillean majority from Dutch society. Second, it is to be acknowledged that the statistics may be biased by cultural artefacts, to a certain extent. Interaction between indicted young Antilleans (and Moroccans or Cape Verdians) on the one hand and police and judiciary on the other is following a black-white scheme, presumably. The recent study of Dr. Mieke Komen (NRC Handelsblad 10 October 2005) showed that blacks appear to behave 'obstinate', e.g. in court, while the whites appear to take a more humble and responsive position. So, the whites were punished less severely than their black counterpart, in comparable cases. Dr. Van San showed considerable doubt with regard to the findings and conclusions of Dr. Komen. She made the objection that comparable cases in court do not exist as too many details are specific and different. The judiciary may have been forced to counter-act more severely in the cases of the immigrant youngsters in relation to their background and the circumstances. For her, there is no reason to see 'judiciary prejudice' as a major cause of 'black prisons'.

It is clear that crime and radicalisation attract the highest political attention, but it regards the smallest numbers. It needs a clear and strong public counter-action. Dr. Tesser referred to this point as well as to an excessive feeling of discrimination and victimisation among young offenders and radicalised immigrants. It is a political risk factor that is difficult to moderate.

3.2.2 Expert opinion on the first generation

Two issues related to indicators, the first generation and its integration deserve attention. It regards the expert opinion on an issue of highest public concern, being the position of young immigrant women and the care for the aged immigrants. A number – some may assume a considerable number – of young immigrant women, who arrived recently as newcomers in the Netherlands have arrived here as so-called import-brides of men belonging to the second generation (Sterckx & Bouw 2005). In combination with reported family violence and e.g. the practice of genital mutilation against Somali women the group or a considerable part of the group has attracted highest political concern, for two reasons. First, they were seen as a backward immigration group, who would not be able to keep up with the progress made by the second generation. And second they were seen as the victim of their culture and religion (e.g. Hirsi Ali 2006-05-24).

Aged immigrants of the first generation may have special needs in relation to care for the elderly. This is a neglected point of attention in public debate, as was stated by a number of committed experts, i.e. experts belonging to the second generation themselves, assessing the needs and care as offered to their parents.

3.2.2.1 Newcomers – gender issues, i.e. brides' import and genital mutilation

For the government, 'bride import' is a severe risk with regard to integration, as was made clear e.g. by Dr. Tesser. So it is for MP Mrs. Sterk. She has noticed that it is even high among highly educated young members of the second generation. It re-creates a vulnerable group of marriage partners, who are only marginally integrated, while the children of the third generation run again the risk of backwardness on the most important integration indicators, such as language, intercultural contact and school achievement. It is an issue of greatest political concern. Actually, the integration policies and objectives may be counter-acted by the bride import mechanism. Inter-generational deficiency is feared to be continued or even to be reinforced. For the government, it is a priority objective to require a high integration effort and achievement of 'imported' marriage partners, by an entrance test at the Dutch Embassy in the country of origin, in advance of further integration efforts and achievements to be realised as a new resident of the country. The major opposition party in Parliament, i.e. the Labour Party, has agreed, more or less, with the government's assessment. It does not agree, however, with the different entrance requirements that are now applied by the government. With regard to the entrance test the Labour Party does not take a principle rejecting position, as the more radical opposition of Greens and Socialists does. It points at the infeasibility of entrance test and therefore intends to reject the proposals for practical

reasons.⁵⁸ In principle, MP Mr. Dijsselbloem, the Labour Party's speaker on integration policies, would prefer to require that incoming partners should be *literate* at primary school level or higher in their country of origin, so being able to attend courses and classes in the Netherlands. He is convinced that the strongest risk factor against integration is the illiteracy of many brides, particularly from the Mediterranean countries and from the most important refugee regions, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Central Africa.

MP Mrs. Sterk raised also another issue of great concern. It regards the mutilation of young women in a number of Muslim cultures through genital circumcision. She is absolutely against this practice, as all authorities, political parties, etc. in the Netherlands. Her point of departure is, however, that policies should be directed towards help for the young women, if necessary via unlikely methods. Best would be a special lesson on gender mutilation in the frame of the obligatory integration courses, among others. She would not be in favour of individual control of girls, who return to the country, e.g. after a holiday, as proposed by MP Mrs. Ayaan Hirsi Ali.

3.2.2.2 Aged immigrants of the first generation – inappropriate care

As representatives of the immigrant groups that started to arrive in the fifties and early sixties from Southern Europe, Mrs. Garcia and MR. Sittrop know that many elder immigrants are not well integrated, in terms of the integration indicators. They do not speak and understand the language well, participation in society is low, etc. Their expectation is pessimistic, as age comes with handicaps and oblivion.

The perspective of these immigrants may have been an old age in the country of origin, and great numbers live there, most of the time or part of the year. That applies mostly to those who could afford to build a (little) house for themselves, which most could not.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, most have stayed in the Netherlands after retirement, unemployment or early dismissal. They stayed because of their children who had settled well in the Netherlands, their passport, social security⁶⁰ and health service, or loss of contacts in the country of origin. They should be allowed to become old in the Netherlands in a decent way, and they should deserve decent treatment and care. However, they cannot be sure that they will get it, and many of their children fear bad treatment, making them angry, against Dutch society and Dutch institutions. In this frame it is observed that the general institutions and care for the elderly are not appropriate for elder immigrants. The institutions are not adapted adequately to the needs and expectations of the elder immigrants. The elder immigrants need specific institutions and care adjusted to their competence (e.g. with regard to language) and needs. The 'white' or Dutch institutions are far from feasible adjustment, although Mr. Sittrop and Mrs. Garcia have observed a few interesting experiments in immigrant neighbourhoods. At least the elder immigrants should keep some local support for their clubs where they can meet, as a way of institutionalised day care for them.

According to Dr. Tesser there is only light policy concern with regard to elder immigrants and the services they may need. There is a known gap between the services as offered now in the country and the care for the elderly

⁵⁸ The test will require the application of international telecommunications, e-speech recognition and e-test management at the highest level of sophistication, to decide on the difference between speakers of Dutch at the absolute minimum level and non-speakers of the language (NRC Handelsblad 18-01-2006). The absolute minimum level will be sufficient to pass the test. The Minister, Mrs. Rita Verdonk, assured the Parliament that the system will work, or that infancy troubles can be corrected in the first phase (Volkskrant 19-01-2006).

⁵⁹ Actually, these repatriates (and others) were harshly 'punished' for their Dutch and small Dutch pension. The new health insurance law requires that all persons who have any Dutch income should register to a Dutch health insurance of at least some 100 Euro per month and pay a yearly retribution of 4.4% of their income. For many repatriates the sum is higher than their Dutch pension, whereas they have to rely on health services in their country of living. They can, however, apply for an additional income sum as to compensate them for their new Dutch obligations. Following court decisions, Parliamentary arousal and advice of the European Commission the new law is to be repaired on this point. The government has announced that the insurance fee will be made dependent of the health costs in the country of living. For Morocco this will be 1% of the Dutch fees or around one Euro per month and for Turkey 5% or around five Euro per month (NRC Handelsblad 30-05-2006).

⁶⁰ Social security keeps a number of aged immigrants in the Netherlands, as they do not receive the full basic national pension. For that, a person must have spent 50 years in the country. The deficit is paid per person by the municipality, on the condition that the person lives in the municipality.

as preferred by immigrant cultures. It is, however, the responsibility of the service providers and the municipalities to find the best match between the offer and the demand.

Most Dutch-Indies people of the first generation have accommodated themselves quickly and fully to the Dutch society. Most of them saw themselves as political refugees, with strong hesitations to return and to visit Indonesia as well as family that has stayed in the Republic. Many identified themselves as former colonial associates. They and their organisations have never asked for the recognition as an ethnic minority and the Dutch authorities never recognised them in that respect.⁶¹ Integration was feasible for most people concerned, because they used Dutch as their language and they had some basic knowledge of Dutch customs and peculiarities. The cold reception, as acknowledged recently after 50 years, was, however, hardly bearable. Many, however, suffered silently under the conditions of repatriation.

3.2.3 Expert opinion on culture and identity

3.2.3.1 Background culture and roots search

Mrs. Garcia and others remarked that some people of the later generations have lost all interest in their roots. However, many others continue to show great interest in their roots and go on 'roots search'.

Dr. Bijnaar's institution NINSEE has been founded three years ago with the public aim to be the living memory of the slavery past of black Surinamese people and others in the Netherlands as well as the living memory of the Dutch role in the system of slave trade and exploitation. As such her institution represents the background culture of many immigrants and immigrant groups in the country and it is a special place for people on roots search. In addition, Dr. Bijnaar's own research interests regard the Creole customs and practices of Surinamese people in Surinam and in the Netherlands, in particular with regard to money transfer and savings (the so-called *kasmoni*), as well as the culture and practice of estate slavery in the Dutch West-Indies and the post-slavery past. Her publications include, among others: *In search of silence – how to find the cultural heritage of the Dutch slavery past*.

A new cultural institution in this field is Imagine Identity and Culture. The institution is represented by Mrs. Van der Linden and Mrs. Raat. Its mission is to visualise the culture and identity of the immigrants in the Netherlands. One side of the mission regards the inside level of culture and identity, i.e. what is to be shown from within the culture of a specific group. Many immigrants and immigrant groups appreciate the show, but Mrs. Van der Linden and Mrs. Raat thought that it is most urgently needed by the more marginalised persons and groups who are in urgent need of a safe environment for themselves. Therefore, the persons and the groups are in need of certain anchor points and they may even undergo a process of radicalisation in that respect. The anchor point can be represented by the traditional high culture of the country of origin, also among immigrants who have never participated in that high culture. It occurred e.g. at a recent exhibition of Moroccan high culture, organised in the frame of 400 years of diplomatic contact between Morocco and the Netherlands. At the exhibition 300 immigrant women without any previous relation to Moroccan high culture came with their children to a special meeting on women, children and Moroccan culture.

All cultural projects of Imagine Identity and Culture are embedded in the strong ties between immigrants and their culture of origin. These ties are not only imaginary ties but they are quite real, e.g. in relation to easy means of international communication (mobile phones, cheap international lines, Internet and e-mail, etc.) and cheap flights to many places where immigrants came from. To a certain extent, the ties are maintained from the country of origin and the family living there, because of the frequent and high money transfers to them.

For their roots search the people of the new generations may address themselves to the existing immigrant organisations. It offers a new and reinforced *raison d'être* for the immigrant organisations, beyond that of the

⁶¹ As to exclude them from any ethnic minority status a special rule applies to Dutch minority statistics. It is that persons born in Indonesia or persons with parents born in Indonesia are not registered as belonging to an ethnic minority. All persons from any other Third World country, however, are registered as belonging to an ethnic minority.

meeting place of aged immigrants. Mrs. Garcia stated that the organisation she represents strongly supports the cultural heritage functions of the immigrant organisations and the roots search of the later generations. In this respect the organisation has been strongly in favour of cultural heritage centres related to the different immigrant communities. To a certain extent, this policy aim is embedded in recent policies with regard to the cultural heritage of minorities in the Netherlands.

It is observed that a number of second generation students prefer to establish their own student clubs, with a certain level of exclusivism. Mrs. Garcia wondered whether this phenomenon points at a certain need of cultural isolation or that practical points make them do so, such as the lack of time and money for more. Personally, she would not be in favour of any tendency towards cultural isolation. As far as the roots search of the second and later generation would lead to isolation from the Dutch society or, worse, to radicalisation it should be an object of research, according to Dr. Tesser. It could make appropriate policies and measures necessary.

In addition, Mrs. Garcia referred to some specific isolation problems related to the falling apart of the former Yugoslav Republic in the nineties. First was that each new country recognised its new national and immigrant identity here. New organisations of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Macedonians and Albanians in the Netherlands were founded. Hostility was, maybe, not as great as in the region itself, but tensions were high, in relation to both national and religious conflict. A second tension emerged with the arrival of new immigrants from the region, consisting of refugees and asylum seekers, who often were highly educated persons compared to the guest workers of the sixties. Their competence and expectations did not match with those of (former) guest workers.⁶² As a consequence of both developments the existing ‘Yugoslav’ organisations had to be dissolved and new ones for the national groups, for religious groups and the refugees were to be established. More recently it was observed that the elder immigrants from the post-Yugoslav region do not appreciate the dating of their children with young refugees or children of refugees from the region beyond the new divides.

3.2.3.2 Urban culture

From his trend studies and the analyses of the signs of the time Dr. Rohde referred to a couple of cultural trends among young urban migrants. His first point of observation was that cultural differences and multiculturalism appear to be absolutely normal among young people in the Netherlands, contrary to most other age groups, who maintain rather strict cultural divides. Younger and coloured collaborators of Signs of the Time reported (1) an extended pattern of multicultural practices and processes of informal integration among young people, both black and white, and (2) tensions between ethnic groups in relation to e.g. 0911 and the Van Gogh assassination in combination with the contradictory necessity of double or even triple cultures and identities for young immigrants of the second generation. For the latter Dr. Rohde referred to the tension between (1) the family at home and the gratitude young people feel or should feel towards their parents, (2) the school that is a boring nuisance to them, and (3) the urban street as an attractive arena for fun and pleasure for young man or the virtual street as the attractive space of sms and other mobile media for the girls. The challenge is to find modes of living between these tensions, e.g. by increased interests of the schools in the parents of the young and second generation immigrants, organised or semi-organised sports, accepted norms and rules, effective mediation and coaching, balanced support against (the feeling of) discrimination, e.g. on the labour market, in discos, etc., and role models “who made it” in the new urban and media culture such as certain rappers, Jennifer Lopez, but also Kofi Annan and Nelson Mandela.

For Mrs. Van der Linden and Mrs. Raat it is a special mission of a cultural institution such as theirs to construe, disseminate and promote cultural crossovers via the cultural projects of Imagine Identity and Culture. These should be attractive for the young generations, both immigrant and native, in the Dutch urban context. It should reflect their joint daily *urban culture*. The projects of Imagine Identity and Culture often include also hard issues of urban life such as homosexuality among young people, HIV, sexual exploitation of young immigrant women,

⁶² They often did not match with those of the receiving society as a whole, in the sense that the receiving society was not easy with making professional positions for them available.

etc. Imagine Identity and Culture is a cultural partner in projects like these, in co-operation with e.g. self-organisations, pressure groups, schools, street corner work, etc.

3.3 Conclusions on generations and integration as indicated

Apparently, statistics and annual integration reports play a rather marginal role in expert opinion. In our expert interviews, neither direct nor indirect references to the many materials that are available have not been made frequently. Apart from Dr. Tesser, who is directly involved in the production of national statistics and annual reports, most experts did not react clearly or they referred to other knowledge that was available to them in response to the data that I presented to them. So, they referred to other knowledge from relevant experience or from targeted research not being part of the national statistics and annual reports. Part of the negligence will be related to competition between researchers, experts, research institutes and expert centres as referred to in the introductory chapter as well as paradigmatic one-sidedness or blind-eyes.

The other apparent point is that most experts showed a high interest in the future, chances and opportunities of the young and second immigrant generations, as well as the specific impediments they are faced with. To a high extent, most experts see them as decisive stakeholders of the future of the country, the national economy, the cultural identity of the people living in the Netherlands, etc.

In the statistics and the annual reports the generation issue is more or less permanently present, but from a different angle. It is part of the Dutch definition of ethnicity. Therefore: no breakdown without references to the first or second generation, with or without significance. Its significance is restricted, however. It is an extension of the first generation, the first generation being the heart of the matter. It does not reflect the interest in the future, the chances and the opportunities of the young and second immigrant generations, as shown by most experts. Therefore, the generation indicators of the Dutch statistics and annual reports does not clarify sufficiently and appropriately relevant issues with regard to young immigrant people and the future. Clarification ended where it has been assessed that some progress was made, but that a level of integration such as that of the native young people was not (yet) achieved.

I may discuss several reasons for this, namely:

1. As referred to in the introductory chapter, generation as an ethnicity marker has been introduced originally in the seventies and the eighties with the aim to allocate special funds to schools in relation to the number of ethnic minority children among their pupils. At that moment it was certainly not clear that 'educational backwardness' would re-occur in the second generation, but it was assumed that immigrant parents would not be able or willing to foster an educational climate at home as appropriate for homework, learning-oriented behaviour and attitudes, etc. For the second immigrant generation the first generation of the parents was supposed to be a severe impediment to be counter-acted by the 1.9 head count. In this frame the research interest in the chances, opportunity and future of the children was restricted and remained restricted.
2. Policies have been primarily concerned with the adult working first generation of immigrant persons and families, and their integration problems, such as insufficient knowledge of Dutch as a second language and increasing dependence on social security. The national policy makers were much less interested in the second generation and its chances, perspectives and future.⁶³ As linking problems between the second and the first generation policy makers refer e.g. to import-brides, cultural isolation, family problems, criminal involvement, etc. Policy makers do not assign contracts to 'their' policy-oriented social indicators paradigm to give priority to other aspects of the second immigrant generation, i.e. its chances, challenges, opportunities and future. So, the negative assessment is repeated for the second generation, to a certain extent, notwithstanding the independent researchers and research units that follow the social indicators paradigm.

⁶³ They are neither interested very much in the care for aged immigrants.

3. The most relevant point with regard to the second generation and its integration that follows from national statistics and annual reports is that the second generation almost fully coincides with young age groups among immigrants. Special effects of the second generation can hardly be separated from age effects for all or most ethnic groups.
4. With regard to the strongest impediments against the chances etc. of the second generation the social indicators paradigm offers a rather weak knowledge base. It should regard a functional knowledge base for the study and the meta-study of a wide range of different impediments, such as inappropriate family practices, failing matches between 'white' institutions and 'ethnic' young people, criminal involvement or involvement in violent political movements. The virtual census that has been built up on crime and ethnicity (KLPD, CBS & WODC 2005) is perhaps the best possible achievement. For these issues research into cultural factors, following the qualitative methodology of e.g. ethnographic research, is much more appropriate.

As a provisional conclusion I may suggest that further immigrant generation research should certainly be set up as an extension or a special subject of current research on integration indicators. I will recommend to make the generation issue, its chances, future and opportunities as well as its impact of the future of the country a core issue of future research. I will also recommend to adapt the social indicators paradigm to these issues, as far as possible, and to combine the contributions of research on cultural factors and social indicators at this point.

4 Integration policies and the Dutch integration debate⁶⁴

Integration has been the object of fierce political debate in the Netherlands since 2000. In this chapter I will first give an overview of the policies and the debate on behalf of the most important pieces of documentation, such as Prof. Scheffer's influential newspaper article 'The multicultural drama' that announced the fierce debate, literature on Pim Fortuyn (Chorus & De Galan 2002; Pels 2003), the report of the Parliamentary Committee on integration and integration policies (Blok Report 2003), the government's reaction and the objectives with regard of the new integration policies as implemented by the new governments since 2002.

In the second part of the chapter I will discuss the opinions of the interviewed experts on integration policy issues that are apparently relevant for the integration of young and second generation immigrants. These issues are:

1. The necessity of restricted and selective immigration policies,
2. The individual immigrant should know and should learn – what more and what better,
3. The management of cultural diversity and the improvements as necessary,
4. Segregation or integration: what balance?
5. Islam and integration – is it possible and expectable?
6. Immigrant youth at risk – effective tracks as needed,
7. Public communication and information – what should everybody know?

4.1 Documentation

4.1.1 Ground zero in 2001

Most important point to be documented is the shift in Dutch immigration and integration policies in 2001-2002 and in the rhetoric of political debate. Therefore, we have to go back to 'ground zero' of Dutch integration policies in 2001. In rhetoric and debate the situation then was one of calm easygoing development towards a country that reluctantly had accepted its actual status as an immigration country and where the condition for integration, shared citizenship and multiculturalism were reasonable. This situation was portrayed in the report of the Scientific Council of the Government WRR of 2001 (WRR 2001) and a report of Ching Lin Pang for INTPOL that described the history of integration policies for the period 1970-2002 (Ching 2002). The government had introduced a package of integration courses for adult immigrants and it had made the latter obligatory for newcomers in the second half of the nineties. It had started to encourage the participation of 'oldcomers' in these courses too. It followed with the introduction of the integration courses the 1989 assessment of the WRR, in which learning Dutch as a second language was said to be the highest priority for giving immigrants a chance in society (WRR 1989).

In 2001 the WRR laid highest emphasis on civic participation of the new inhabitants of the country, following the examples of encouraged participation in immigrant countries such as Canada, the USA, Israel, etc. Nobody was against encouraged civic participation and most authorities accepted the notion of the Netherlands as an immigration country, be it more or less reluctantly.

At the time some researchers have published the indicators that proved that under the surface there were tendencies towards geographical segregation (e.g. Tesser et al 1996), remaining deficits at schools and tendencies towards black and white schools (Tesser et al. 1994 onwards), or latent labour market discrimination (Muskens 1996), but most participants in political debate showed no or light concern with the state of the integration. As a negative point some comments were that the Dutch majority stood indifferent towards immigrants and diversity, and that indifference was falsely interpreted as openness and tolerance, e.g. compared

⁶⁴ Summaries of the most important policy documents and contribution to the Dutch debate are attached to the report as attachment 6

to the majority in neighbouring countries such as Belgium and Germany, where incidents of open discrimination were observed in the nineties.

4.1.2 The Multicultural Drama of 2000

In the beginning of the new century some critical observers made clear and strong statements concerning the lack of integration among immigrants in the Netherlands. Most outspoken was the author Prof. Paul Scheffer, who criticized the ‘multicultural drama’ in 2001 (Scheffer 2000). He argued that multiculturalism as the dominant ideology of Dutch public opinion had led to the negligence of what integration should be and the requirements that were to be put on newcomers in Dutch society. Second line of argument was that Dutch opinion makers did not have a clear idea of the norms and values that should prevail in their own society, i.e. those of the national constitution and legal order as well as the historical markers of Dutch pride and patriotism. Also Koopmans’ comparative report on Germany and the Netherlands is to be mentioned (Koopmans 2002). He showed that the integration rates, e.g. with regard to education and labour market participation, were lower in the Netherlands than in Germany. However, the immigrant integration policy effort had been high in the Netherlands since the seventies and the eighties, whereas it had been almost fully absent in Germany. Policy efforts had apparently been ineffective compared to doing nothing and muddling through.⁶⁵ These publications have marked a change of the tide – since then, the integration debate has become rather controversial and the policy aims of the government have changed considerably. And then came 0911. At the time Pim Fortuyn has appeared on the scene, until his assassination. Since autumn 2001⁶⁶ he mobilised a growing number of voters for a movement that wanted to go Dutch at all levels⁶⁷, that would like to make an end to multicultural ideology⁶⁸, that did not hesitate to underline that integration should be (almost) equal to assimilation, and that supported most restrictive immigration policies.⁶⁹

In May 2002 Pim Fortuyn was murdered, but his ‘movement’ won the elections two weeks thereafter⁷⁰, together with the Christian Democrats of Jan-Peter Balkenende, who had shared Fortuyn’s standpoint with regard to the ‘Pink Drama’ and the loss of national and Christian norms and values in modern multicultural society.⁷¹ The Fortuynists won the elections and formed a coalition with the Christian Democrats and the conservative Liberals that survived for half a year.⁷² Then the Fortuynists collapsed because of internal strife. New elections showed

⁶⁵ Koopmans also explained the difference by relating these to the pillarisation of the Netherlands that should have paved the way for an Islamic pillar, e.g. in education. It could have deterred the Dutch from a critical assessment of their manifest policy intention, reinforcing latent mechanisms towards ineffective integration policies.

⁶⁶ For the details: a month before 0911 the natural leader of rich, lenient and rather social Holland, Wim Kok, had resigned from re-election, leaving the coalition and the Labour Party to an unpopular new leader. In the background played the Srebrenica drama on which the national assessment was near to be published, after seven years. After its presentation in early 2002 Wim Kok and his Cabinet resigned definitively, one month before the national elections.

⁶⁷ And not in the same constitutional mode that was promoted by Paul Scheffer and others, but in a clear ‘we versus they’ tone.

⁶⁸ As among researchers the multicultural ideology with regard to ethnic relations and integration policies was much less clear and widespread than the opponents said that it was. Only the Greens referred in their political programme clearly to the advantages of diversity and multiculturalism, together with individual participants in national and local public debate. On behalf of the interests they had to represent, leaders of minority organisations and mediators e.g. in the field of the support for refugees and asylum seekers had to use a multicultural rhetoric and arguments. So, the multicultural voice was perhaps loud and clear, but the political power and influence remained rather low.

⁶⁹ Restrictive rhetoric is perhaps a ‘privilege’ of the political right in the Netherlands, but restrictive immigration policies have been dominant since the first oil crisis for all parties, leading to the restrictive immigration law of 2002. Since then, the implementation under the present Minister of Immigration and Integration Rita Verdonk has become as restrictive as allowed by the law, i.e. for poor immigrants, and more lenient for rich immigrants, brain workers and others from third countries who are apparently needed for the national economy (Alberts 2006).

⁷⁰ He was not murdered by a Muslim radical, but by a white radical veganist who was convinced that the animal maltreaters of the agricultural industries would take over with Pim Fortuyn (Chorus & De Galan 2002)

⁷¹ Jan-Peter Balkenende was an extra-ordinary professor of Christian social and political philosophy at Amsterdam Free University, when he became the leader of the Christian Democrats in spring 2001. He declared in the months before the elections that he was against multiculturalism as a political principle.

⁷² Minister of Immigration and integration was the Fortuynist Mr. Nawijn, who had been a local Christian Democrat until his nomination. In the nineties he has been the Director of the Immigration Agency IND that he has left after a conflict with his Minister (Vinckx 10-05-1996).

the comeback of Labour, but the Christian Democrats preferred to continue the co-operation with the conservative Liberals under Jan-Peter Balkenende. For the majority they found support among a more progressive liberal faction. The new coalition started in summer 2003; Rita Verdonk became the Minister of Immigration and Integration.⁷³

4.1.3 The Parliamentary Committee on Integration Policies, 2002-2004

As a reaction to Scheffer's publication, 0911, and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, a Parliamentary Investigation Committee has been installed on 3 December 2002. It is named after its President MP Mr. Stef Blok. It has assessed the national integration policies since the seventies. On the basis of documentation research and public hearings the Committee concluded (Blok Report January 2004) that most immigrants, up to 70% of them, have found their way towards integration, as measured by indicators such as self-sufficiency, linguistic competence and participation in society. It was, however, not the effect of national or local policies. The policies had no or an unclear impact. The conclusion of the Committee was that integration was much less a problem than was suggested in the election campaigns and in political debate since 2001. The conclusion was declined by e.g. the conservative Liberals⁷⁴, to which faction Committee President Blok belonged.

The government's reaction (Letter of the Minister of Immigration and Integration of 19 May 2004) underlined however the great and undiminished need for clear and further immigration and integration policies, while a considerable number of immigrants and their descendants still showed to be 'backward' on important integration indicators, such as education, language proficiency and labour market participation (see above in the chapter on integration indicators), and while immigrants were over-represented on counter-indicators of integration, such as (violent) crime and bride-import.

4.1.4 New integration policies since 2002

In the Letter, in the Coalition's constituent paper and in number of policy papers the most important new aims of the national integration policies have been published.⁷⁵ These are:

1. The obligatory exam of all immigrants, new and old, to prove their language proficiency, at the risk of a fine.
2. The introductory test in Dutch as a second language that will be a pre-condition for a permit of access to the country, e.g. as a family re-unifier or marriage partner.
3. The immigrants themselves will be responsible for their integration courses and the costs of it, with the option that successful candidates can expect to receive a partial refund for their costs after examination.
4. The municipalities will have to organise citizens' days at which those who have passed their integration exams will receive an integration certificate.⁷⁶

The aim remains to keep immigration as restricted as possible, in accordance with the immigration law of 2002 and its implementation rules. It means, among others, the following:

1. As to diminish the number of 'import-brides' further requirements have been introduced, e.g. with regard to the age of the partners and the income of the Dutch partner.

⁷³ At the moment she is running for the leadership of the conservative Liberals. She said that she is not left nor right but straight ahead.

⁷⁴ Halfway, in summer 2003 MP Mr. Lazrak, a member of the Committee, who represented at the time the Socialist Party, complained that NIZW, the Netherlands Institute of Care and Welfare that was assigned to do most of the Committee's desk research, was not independent and was too multiculturalist in its integration theories for the critical assessment of the multicultural drama in the Netherlands. NIZW kept its assignment and the Committee concluded as referred to above.

⁷⁵ The government's and the coalition's initial time frame was to have the new legislation passed in 2005. In the meantime, the Parliamentary procedures are not yet concluded, among others because of implementation risks (Groenendijk 2004; Groenendijk 2005; Groenendijk & Kortman 2005; Doorduyn 2005). The Parliament has asked for a risk analysis. Its report confirmed most risks related to the implementation, such as unclear legal protection of rejected candidates or the application of untested ICT (De Ridder & Koster 2006; Santing 2006).

⁷⁶ The certificate is not the passport. Therefore the candidates have to pass also the full naturalisation procedure and the terms that apply to this procedure.

2. In general, entrance procedures have been made complex and expensive.
3. General pardon of those who have stayed illegally in the country or who have become illegal residents as ‘asylum seekers denied access’ is not encouraged, on the contrary. After a very limited number of ‘old’ asylum seekers who have been generally pardoned⁷⁷ no general pardon has been allowed any more. ‘Asylum seekers denied access’ have to leave the country, either voluntarily and with IOM help, or by force. In individual cases the Minister can decide to give out a permit of stay as a form of ministerial clemency. The Minister has done so 750 of cases, without giving new hope and expectation to others in comparable circumstances.⁷⁸
4. It is proposed to turn illegal residence into a crime.
5. Double citizenship is not allowed, in principle. It should be discouraged as much as possible.
6. For the Dutch labour market many immigrants are needed, both for the lowest segments (green houses, cleaning, restaurant kitchens, etc.) as well as in the highest and specialist segments. Entrance for those needed for the labour market has been enlightened somewhat, both in relation to intra-European mobility (East European workers,⁷⁹ students, etc.) and to third country residents (specialists as needed and as not available in Europe, brain workers, high income workers – Alberts 2006).⁸⁰ In May 2006 the government has proposed a new set of entrance permits that should encourage access for immigrants, who are needed for the labour market (KIEM 19-05-2006).

The coalition and its Minister of Immigration and Integration say that they follow a harsh, but justified policy line, as necessary.

In the next chapter we present and discuss opinions and ideas of the experts we have interviewed on the new integration policies. Their frame of reference are both these new integration policies as well as related points of discussion such as the perspectives of the Islam in the Netherlands, the perspectives of young people and women, specific immigrant groups, etc.

4.2 Expert opinion on new integration policies

4.2.1 Restrictive immigration policies

Further to his statement of the failure the integration and the multicultural drama in the Netherlands Prof. Paul Scheffer stated that restrictive and selective immigration policies are a necessary precondition of integration and integration policies. The country should know which immigrants it needs and therefore invites to come. The country should be clear and restrictive on all unwanted immigrants. So far, the government followed a restrictive line with regard to immigration and border control in negative terms, but it has not clarified the need of immigrants in positive terms. He stated: “Those immigrants are to be welcomed in the country who match with the economic and social needs of the country. At the moment there are only small and badly handled streams of immigration on behalf of the economic needs of the country, e.g. at the level of brainworkers. Immigration was a matter and still is a matter of accepting all those people who cannot be denied access, such as asylum seekers, Antilleans and others with a Dutch passport, and family re-unifiers. Even for these groups restrictive policies seemed to work as was shown by the declined immigration rates in the last years. However, selective immigration policies are something different.”

⁷⁷ Around 10% of 26.000 ‘old’ cases, who have started their procedure under the old immigration law before 2001 and who have been in the procedure for five years or longer.

⁷⁸ The government has been accused by the Council of Europe of too harsh asylum and expatriation procedures (Zapfl-Helbling 2005). The defence of the Minister was, among others, the high number of cases in which she had shown ministerial clemency (Verdonk 2006).

⁷⁹ The east-border will be opened fully by January 2007.

⁸⁰ It is assumed that at least 125.000 to 225.000 illegal residents live and work in the Netherlands (Engbersen et al. 2004).

4.2.2 Individual learning and empowerment

4.2.2.1 Learning the national language

For the government, the interest in immigrant generations is 'integration-related'. Therefore, for a senior civil servant such as Dr. Tesser negative assessments with regard to immigrant generations are to be counter-acted and positive tendencies are to be reinforced by actions of national or local authorities and institutions.

For the government, then, immigrant integration is an issue of highest priority and concern. Since the late nineties, every newcomer is obliged to participate in an integration course, with the aim to learn the national language as well as Dutch customs, norms and values as needed for professional or social self-sufficiency. The government is preparing laws that require the above-mentioned entrance test and the obligatory test with regard to the basic knowledge of the national language as well as sufficient knowledge of Dutch customs, norms and values for all immigrants. All immigrants are obliged to prove sufficient proficiency in the national language. They will risk a fine when failing to pass their test. The laws have passed Parliamentary approval and are to be implemented in the course of 2005-2006.

For MP Mrs. Miriam Sterk, who is a young Christian Democrat belonging to the government's majority coalition in Parliament, integration is said to be successful when persons show to participate in society. The participation can certainly be a critical form of participation. It is not just assimilation and adaptation. Decisive factor is communication and therefore proficiency in the national language of communication. For her, the contra-indicators of integration are isolation, low self-sufficiency, joblessness and being unable or hardly able to communicate with others in the national language. The government's policy as supported and encouraged by the Christian Democrats is based upon the strong link between communication and language, and therefore the necessity for each newcomer and immigrant to be proficient the national language. In 2001, the former political leader of the Christian Democrats in Dutch Parliament, MP Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, presently NATO's Secretary-General, has launched the idea of preparatory language examination in the country of origin, particularly for the women, who apparently were not helped by the obligatory integration courses for newcomers.⁸¹ The party and later the centre-right government has adopted a law on preparatory language learning in the country of origin. Although there may have remained some technical problems with the implementation of the law, Mrs. Sterk does not think that the problems should hold up the implementation of the new system. She expects that these problems can be solved in the course of action. The law should be carried out, from 2006 onwards, therefore. The government has also replaced the former integration law for newcomers by a new law on integration. It is supported and encouraged by the Christian Democrats. It settles the obligation of every permanently residing immigrant to prove that he or she is sufficiently proficient in the national language and sufficiently knowledgeable with Dutch customs, culture and values. It will be the own responsibility of the immigrants to acquire the knowledge, which is in line with the Christian Democrats' view on individual responsibility. Immigrants can be refunded for the costs by passing the examination. However, according to MP Mrs. Sterk the new law might have become a rather bureaucratic construct. In that sense the construct is to be scrutinised.

MP Mrs. Sterk would like to state that integration courses should be seen as empowerment actions towards newcomers and immigrants, and therefore as something positive, as a help against isolation and lack of communication.

The government's position is questioned and criticised for some principle and some practical reasons. MP Mr. Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who is a member of Labour Party and the opposition in Parliament, expressed some practical objections, among others. He and Labour do not have the same more fundamental objections that the

⁸¹ For the municipality of Tilburg we assessed that female family re-unifiers showed low interest in public integration support, compared to single women, who were to attend integration courses. The difference appears to be that family members living in the Netherlands offer informal support to family re-unifiers (Muskens 2002). I assume that 'relevant others' will help them too through tests that will take place in the country of origin, whether public authorities in the Netherlands appreciate this or not.

parties left of Labour (Greens, Socialists) have against the new integration policies. He expressed the fear that the proposed entrance test will prove to be infeasible and therefore will have to be adapted. Besides, he would be in favour of improved integration courses in the municipalities, following the recommendations of the Task Force Integration of the former government, both for newcomers and for the 'oldcomers'. Against all odds and intentions, the number of immigrants attending integration courses has decreased under the present government. Also other experts, such as Dr. Bijnaar who is of Surinamese descent and who works at the slave history expert centre NINSEE, agree that newcomers in a society have to learn the language of their new society and they have to find a job. In that sense, they have to adapt themselves to their new society and they share the responsibility for their success with the authorities and institutions of their new society. The fact that many immigrants in the Netherlands still do not speak the language and do not work is to be seen as a missed chance both for themselves and for society.

4.2.3 Cultural diversity management

4.2.3.1 Immigrant expectations

Beyond individual differences all interviewed experts with an immigrant background, i.e. Prof. Akgündüs, Dr. Bijnaar, Mrs. Garcia, Mr. Sittrop, Mrs. Madaya, Mr. Markadonakis, Mr. Pieters, Mrs. van der Linden and Mrs. Raat, represent the idea that for them the Netherlands should be a multicultural society. It should be able and willing to incorporate people with specific identities and cultures related to the background cultures of the immigrant groups in the country. They all believed that they or their parents once arrived in a country that reflected this idea, more or less, and that it had a history of 'diversity management', e.g. via the pillarised legitimization of religion-based institutions as stated in constitution. Now, most of them have become uncertain at this point. They referred to the grown distance of the majority population from immigrant people in general and specific groups such as Muslims or Antilleans or Cape Verdians in particular, and to the 'assimilationist ideology' as expressed in public opinion and national policies since 0911 and the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh in 2002 and 2004, respectively.

4.2.3.2 National identity

In the public debate on integration and identity Prof. Scheffer has argued that it needs a strong identity on the side of the country of arrival, as a pre-condition for the incorporation of great numbers of immigrants from a wide variety of cultures. The country of arrival and the culture and identity of its native majority should not be a culture and identity of negligence and easy convenience or des-interestedness in the own norms and values or those of others. He as well as MP Mrs. Sterk embraced the inauguration ritual as practiced in Canada and other immigration countries for all new citizens, who obtained citizenship.⁸² He and others have observed, however, that the majority culture and identity in the country has become such a culture of negligence, easy convenience and des-interestedness, more or less. The strong Dutch identity should primarily reflect the principle of equality for the law as to be applied to and by all free citizens and inhabitants, as a pre-condition for cultural diversity and integration. So, the cultural integration of the Islam can be realised, both as a religion-based institution and as a personal belief system. So, cultural integration will include the principle of free choice concerning e.g. the individual preservation of a certain cultural identity or the assimilation into the dominant culture. The freedom includes the freedom of to become an apostate from the Islam as a religion-based institution, although the Islam denies that fundamental right to its believers. So, open public debate as needed on e.g. the cultural change of the society is guaranteed.

⁸² In 2006 the government has introduced the ritual as an obligatory ritual in the Dutch municipalities.

4.2.4 Segregation or integration

In four interviews the issue of geographical segregation was discussed. Geographical segregation is seen as a contra-indicator of integration. MP Mrs. Sterk stated that for the full integration of immigrant and native people in the cities and neighbourhoods it is necessary to create mixed cities and neighbourhoods. Now, the coloured immigrants are concentrated in the cheapest neighbourhoods, while the native population and the richer coloured population has moved to the outskirts and surrounding municipalities around the major cities. The process has to be stopped, although policies would run against the demographic processes and market movements. Local aldermen and social housing corporations should develop new policies directed towards mixed neighbourhoods. Prof. Scheffer mentioned it as one of the issues about which the authorities in Amsterdam and elsewhere have 'corrected' the statistics in such a way that the real segregation has been obscured for a number of decades. It is one of the subjects that would be served with clear data and analyses, as it would underline the failing integration, particularly in the major cities and their surrounding suburbs. Mr. Kelderman described the ongoing process of ethnic segregation of the districts in Amsterdam, as he has observed it 'from the street'. He said: "Since the mid-nineties Amsterdam-West is said to be a Mediterranean city, predominantly inhabited by Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch people. Earlier, it was a mixed zone of the new city extensions. In the eighties and nineties, white people and the black middle classes moved in great numbers to a new polder towns of Purmerend and Almere (20 km. north and east of Amsterdam, affordable housing property for the middle classes and the lower middle classes), while the poor black population (Surinamese, Antilleans, Ghanese people) moved to Amsterdam South-East (large apartments in apartment buildings that were affordable for low-income people with state support).⁸³ Since then, Amsterdam-West is seen as the scenery of young Moroccan hangouts. Although the number of street corner workers that Street Corner Work is allowed to deploy in Amsterdam-West is very low in relation to the needs and urgency, it has gained an expert position with regard to Moroccan hangouts on the street, their family relations (e.g. role of elder brothers) and their lack of perspective, for some followed by radicalisation and full rejection of the Dutch welfare state, labour market, etc. The radicalisation can take the direction of Islamism and self-made interpretations of the Qur'an, jihad, etc."⁸⁴ By a process of city upgrading cheap housing is going to be replaced in Amsterdam South-East and Amsterdam-West (Kreling 2006). The hangout districts are, therefore, expected to be moved to the new poor districts, e.g. in Amsterdam-North.

The policy of city upgrading and gentrification could be a risk for the poor and coloured classes in the cities. MP Mr. Dijsselbloem thought that the government and the local authorities should be required to keep affordable houses available in all urban neighbourhoods. These are most needed for young people and particularly for young immigrant people. So, the Labour Party in Parliament and many aldermen in the cities want to stop this process and to maintain 'their' social houses in numbers and quality.

In the frame of concentration and segregation MP Mrs Sterk has questioned the desirability of the own Moluccan neighbourhoods that still exist in a number of cities, almost in the same way as they have been established at their arrival after Indonesian independence.⁸⁵ Neither the colonial heritage nor guilt nor the unity needed for the

⁸³ It is unknown what the attraction factor of Amsterdam South-East was for 'black Amsterdam' – it has not been investigated. Mr. Kelderman and others may suggest that Amsterdam South-East offered the opportunity for founding a new city centre that was attractive for black and urban cultures, whereas the existing city centre did not offer that opportunity that easily. Others may suggest that the reason could have been a threefold process of ethnic segregation streams, i.e. one towards a middle class Almere, one towards a black Amsterdam South-East and one towards a Mediterranean-Muslim Amsterdam-West. See also Kreling 2006.

⁸⁴ Mohamed B., the murderer of Theo van Gogh, had followed this 'path of so-called self-enlightenment'. He had worked as volunteer in youth centres in Amsterdam-West, but radicalised extremely in 2003 and 2004, presumably together with a group that was suspected and partly convicted of forming a terrorist-criminal organisation (Chorus and Olgun 2005).

⁸⁵ The Moluccan population was formed in the beginning by 12.000 soldiers of the Dutch-Indies Army and 28.000 family members, who were repatriated 'temporarily' to the Netherlands in 1950. There they awaited the elections and proclamation of the independent Republic of East Indonesia, which never happened. They preferred to stay in army barracks and camps, first, and later in special neighbourhoods, where they would be prepared for their repatriation to their independent republic. Many of them still believe in their Ideal, and live in their own special neighbourhoods.

Moluccan Independence Movement is enough reason to continue these exclusive Moluccan settlements. So, she would be in favour of their dismantlement.

4.2.5 Islam and integration

4.2.5.1 Be clear

Serious doubt has been raised in Dutch public debate whether the Islam and Muslims can be integrated in a modern and democratic Western society as the Dutch one. In interviews it was referred to the position represented by e.g. MP Mrs. Ayaan Hirsi Ali (Hirsi Ali 2005). Doubt is related to the repression of women and the fatwa on the secularisation and conversion of Muslims that are to be read in the Qur'an as well as to the unbreakable relation between the Islam and the State. Prof. Scheffer referred to these points, among others. He was pleading, however, for a modern and Western Islam that accepts the basic principles of democratic societies – so without discrimination and oppression of women, and with the individual right of secularisation and conversion, the acceptance of the minority position in society for all religious and secular minorities and the separation of Church and State. A country like France is clearer on this than the Netherlands and the Dutch constitution with regard to the separation of Church and State, particularly with regard to religion-based education. At the moment the situation is that the secularised Dutch majority sends its children to more or less secularised schools that are in name Catholic or Protestant religion-based schools. In the frame of the constitution some 40 Islamic religion-based schools have been established since the eighties. According to Prof. Scheffer it could be wise to shift more in the French direction and to make an end to the constitutional freedom of religion-based education, i.e. of Catholic, Protestant and Islamic schools.

4.2.5.2 The Islamic pillar

Both the Dutch Christian Democrats, such as MP Mrs. Mirjam Sterk, and the representatives of an Islamic school and an Islamic university, i.e. Mrs. Madaya and Prof. Akgündüs, are strongly in favour of the constitutional freedom of religion-based education. Mrs. Madaya referred to her moderate position as a Muslim and to the moderate and open climate at her school. The children are raised in full acceptance of the Dutch laws, norms, values and general cultural practices⁸⁶, and extremist interpretations of the Qur'an are counter-acted. Prof. Akgündüs referred to his specialist studies of the Islam as a minority belief system and e.g. its position in secular Turkey. His first point is that the Qur'an itself is not to be seen as a source of extremist positions, certainly not in relation to Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands. He does not think, however, that young students who are inclined to a certain level of extremism should be counter-acted bluntly. He prefers to encourage the dialogue with them, because the main cause of extremism is to be sought in 'ignorance'. In juridical terms he has concluded that the relation between the Islam and the Netherlands reflects the ideas in the Qur'an with regard to the so-called 'Lands of Peace', whose laws have to be abided and with whom the Muslim living there have to co-operate at all levels possible. The Netherlands is not a land at war with the Islam as it is in the eyes of a number of extremists. On the quite controversial point of handshaking between men and women⁸⁷ he made the remark that for him the Qur'an is clear on this point: physical contact is to be avoided and as long as there is no law that would urge a man to shake a woman's hand he would not do so.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ The school participates in all local cultural and sport programmes, with both girls and boys. It does not encourage typically Dutch or Christian festivities such as birthday parties or Christmas.

⁸⁷ The Minister of Immigration and Integration, Mrs. Rita Verdonk was confronted at a meeting with an imam, who refused to shake her hand. It was discussed rather bitterly in the press. From time to time there are also veil controversies, although not with the same sharpness as in France. The state of the affair is that Parliament has accepted a motion that burkas should be forbidden in public places (not implemented by government, so far) and that burkas are actually forbidden in schools and at other places, as these interfere with educational communication. They are also not accepted for judges in court as judges should reflect strict neutrality. For the rest, it is a matter of muddling through since the first local controversy in the eighties.

⁸⁸ During a visit to a mosque Queen Beatrix did not shake hands with the (male) representatives of the Mosque and the Mosque Association (Volkskrant 01-06-2006).

Mrs. Garcia and Mr. Sittrop of the south European association LIZE defended a comparable position, based upon their experience with the Bosniak Muslims who have joined their association. Most of them are very moderate and they should be endorsed in this respect. As far as extremist tendencies among Bosniaks and other Muslims are to be counter-acted the counter-actions, are not served by harsh standpoints e.g. with regard to the separation of State and Church. As long as the tendencies reflect ideas and ideology, dialogue and communications would be much more effective.

4.2.5.3 Three phases

Dr. Sunier, who is an anthropologist of religion at the University of Amsterdam, has observed a number of important changes in the Islamic communities in the Netherlands. The communities emerged with the massive immigration of guest workers and their families from Morocco and Turkey in the sixties and the seventies. He observed three phases since then, that coincided more or less with generations and the rise of a second generation of Turkish-Dutch Muslims since the 1980s and 1990s. The first phase was only loosely connected both to the Islam and to integration. As far as the Islam played a role it was at the background of organisations that had primarily a social function. The Islam-orientation was, however, predominantly very traditionalist, representing the very traditional Islam of the Turkish and Moroccan villages. There was no place, e.g., for women, other than that of the serving and baring housewife. Young women had to obey their family and take care of its 'honour'. Arranged marriage must have been the rule.

Since the end of the 1980s, however, a new and young generation has come up. It was oriented less to the country of origin and showed, at least for an important part, great interest in religious questions and issues. It led to fierce debate on what an Islamic mosque organisation should be and how it should be related (or not) to the non-Islamic surrounding society. Partly as their ally the political Milli Görüs⁸⁹ movement, that was not related to the Turkish state and functioned at (at least) arm-length distance from Dutch society, could act much more pro-active and achieve a position of control and influence on the further development of (Turkish) Islam in the Netherlands, to a certain extent. It has opened boarding schools for Muslim adolescents attending regular Dutch education in the major Dutch cities. Since the later 1990s, the Amsterdam-based Milli Görüs organisation has positioned itself as a mediator and bridge between Muslims and Dutch society. In Rotterdam this position is represented by SPIOR, which is the association of all Muslim organisations in the city. All leadership has shifted from the old and first generation to young Muslim leaders of the new generations, said Mr. Tuijnman, who is the municipality's policy adviser on minority and integration issues. Here and there, also other groups have started debate and organisations, such as women in their relation to Islam, homosexuals, and other minorities. These initiatives were directed to a modern Islam in a Western society that should be the basis for Muslim integration in the country.

Recently, a third phase followed, identified by Dr. Sunier as the rhetoric phase. In this frame arguments and communication strategies have become the decisive factors. It is a cultural frame of Islamic identity, which is found on Islamic web-sites and in local initiatives, study groups, women's groups, etc. It expresses the power and self-confidence of young believers. It goes hand in hand with interest in the political issues since 0911, such as radicalisation and terrorism/jihad, but also dropout from school, criminal involvement, and the culture of victimisation.⁹⁰ Its position on the integration scale is, however, not clear. There are continued and further tendencies in the direction of integration, but also one in the direction of self-chosen isolation and radicalisation. For Dr. Tesser, this tendency and its relation to international terrorism is one of the major concerns for the government and public opinion. However, Dr. Sunier is not convinced that isolation, radicalisation and,

⁸⁹ Milli Görüs was never forbidden in the Netherlands, as it was in Germany, being an anti-constitutional organisation according to the German High Court. Its relation to the international, Germany-based Milli Görüs organisation has been rather loose since the mid-nineties. However, this month the German board has apparently removed the liberal Dutch board and staff, replacing it by a new board and staff (Beusekamp 12-05-2006; Olgun 13-05-2006).

⁹⁰ Victims of violence, oppression, etc. deserve and get attention and support, both from professionals and from wider communities. So, it might be 'useful' for certain individuals and groups to be portrayed and recognised as a victim. The term of 'the culture of victimisation' refers to the process of (false) portrayal and recognition of victims.

ultimately, Islamist terrorism represent a major stream among present-day young Muslims in the Netherlands. First he referred to a number of experts, who believe that an ongoing process of secularisation is to be observed or to be expected among Muslims in Western Europe in general and the Netherlands in particular. They observe similarities with what occurred among Christian and Jewish believers in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century. For instance, Prof. Entzinger has interpreted certain research finding in that direction, and a study of the Social and Cultural Planning Office appears to show this tendency. Second, Dr. Sunier would prefer to point at the specific and new meaning of the Islam, as it was developed after the generation change (phase 2) and in line with the recent rhetoric phase. The process and its outcomes are, then, however, less predictable and they will show a wider variety in religious practices and functions. The modern Islam in this society could be a discursive phenomenon, following the difficult and perhaps risky models and lines of 'discursive integration'. The latter concept refers to a society that is kept together by dialogue in all its diversity, and not by a simple system of national values and practices. This position is also endorsed by Prof. Akgündüs. Mr. Tuijnman said that such 'discursive integration' played a major role in the Muslim Dialogues that were organised in Rotterdam since 0911 and the political victory of Fortuynism in the city.⁹¹

4.2.6 Immigrant youth at risks

Most experts agree with Dr. Van San that ethnicity-related crime rates represent contra-indicators of integration. She referred to public concern as expressed in e.g. the government's CRIEM Report on youth and ethnic crime (CRIEM Report 1998). Public concern regards the fear that obvious involvement in criminal practice by a relatively great number of people belonging to the new immigrant generations may be caused by lack of integration and the wrong, but attractive perspectives of criminal careers. MP Mr. Dijsselbloem added to it that presently we are faced with marginalised and marginalising groups of predominantly young immigrants in the cities, whose members are high on unemployment, low on education, high on crime, etc. They feel themselves severely discriminated and they are reinforced as victims of discrimination by their experience or the mediated experience with regard to probation places and jobs, in relation to name, colour, veils, etc. As a consequence a small portion of the generation appears to be very frustrated, cultivating its frustration and submerging in the culture of crime and nuisance or in that of extremist and terrorist Islamism. It may regard small portions, as he said, but they make thing worse for all.

For the authorities in e.g. the municipality of Rotterdam the counter-action against non-integration, nuisance, crime and violence is one of the first local priorities. The local policies include the forced upgrading and gentrification of neighbourhoods and districts, and strict residence control. The policy should diminish long-term and concentrated poverty in the poor districts, particularly among ethnic minorities. In addition, the city has set clear targets with regard to action against crime and nuisance, with special attention for crime and nuisance of young immigrants. Second generation groups in Rotterdam regard a number of Moroccan and Cape Verdian youngsters in particular, while the district authorities observed recently (Volkskrant, 21-12- 2005) the violent break-through of a very young second generation group of Antilleans (age around 10), being the children of well-known criminals of the young first generation. New local and district policies are targeted at diminished nuisance and crime of young Antilleans, particularly with the aid of family coaches, boarding schools and zero tolerance. The implementation of the policies appears to be difficult, however, as Papiamentu-speaking coaches are not sufficiently available on the local labour market and boarding schools need rather some time of preparations.⁹²

⁹¹ In April 2006 WRR, the Scientific Council of the Government, published a set of studies and concluding assessment of democracy-Islam relations. As peaceful tendencies are prevailing among Islamic groups in general and even among most groups of Islamic activists, democratic society should search and find points of contact and dialogue with Islamic groups, including most groups of Islamic activists (WRR 2006). The reception of the report was rather controversial (e.g. Ellian 2006).

⁹² Ideas such as these have been tried out since 2002, in some places with considerable success, and in others without, so far (Muskens 2005).

Mr. Pieters, the president of the Antillean association OCAN, is rather critical on the government's actions and counter-actions targeted at young Antilleans at risk. In his analysis the Dutch authorities, both at the national and the local level, have made a number of policy decisions that are based upon a weak analysis of the situation. The Government, the majority in Parliament, a number of outspoken local authorities and their staff intend primarily to counter-act nuisance making and criminal young Antilleans in a number of neighbourhoods of major cities such as Rotterdam and Tilburg. First and more or less ideological reaction is repressive and zero tolerance counter-action, including repatriation measures and strict border control against trouble-making young Antilleans. Crime counter-action is a priority concern of a national and municipal scheme for Antillean youth policies for 2005-2009. However, such counter-action will be insufficiently effective in practice. For effective counter-action the authorities should develop also a number of preventive strategies and tracks. For these, there is a wider local interest, e.g. among socio-democratic aldermen and local welfare institutions. Preventive strategies and tracks are in line with the policies that were followed in the period 1994-2005, consisting of a special labour market scheme for young and unemployed young Antilleans, national subsidies for local policies in seven cities and a guided housing project in nineteen places.

In his view, the following points are to be taken into consideration. First, the policies should take into consideration the colonial past and the collective traumatic experience of slavery for the Dutch Antilles and its population. Its denial by Dutch politicians has reinforced and mobilised a number of negative feelings and tendencies among young Antilleans, as it did during the insurrection on Curaçao in 1969. Second, the policies should take the causes of poverty on the Dutch Antilles into consideration, while the youth migration flow since the nineties is directly related to it. The Antillean economy has collapsed from very affluent to very poor with the closing of the big oil refineries of Shell and Exxon on Curaçao and Aruba. Young people were dreaming of living on an affluent tropical island, but had to face poverty. The idea was that affluence is (still) guaranteed in the Netherlands for those who arrive there. For Antillean girls and unmarried mothers (very common in Antillean culture) migration to the Netherlands is double attractive or is felt to be even necessary. They cannot work (no work, necessity of child care) and social support is minimal. In the Netherlands social support was reasonable, i.e. four times as high, and until recently they were sure of getting it at arrival.⁹³ Dutch policies should give highest priority to the counter-acting of poverty among (young) Antilleans in the Netherlands as well as to the housing and guidance of those who need it. Poverty is very high, i.e. regards 35% of all Antilleans in the Netherlands against 7% of the native population. Housing and guidance is needed, because young Antilleans in the Netherlands run around without any chance on the public and social Dutch housing markets. Guidance is needed because many of them need help on their way to self-help. Since 2003, a schedule for guided housing has been launched. In 2003 and 2004 19 three-year projects for around 400 places have been initiated in 18 municipalities. This schedule is strongly supported by OCAN and by Mr. Pieters personally, as it offers help for self-help as needed. Usually, Antillean coaches and volunteers offer the guidance. Together with others Mr. Pieters has initiated a certified training course for coaches and volunteers, in co-operation with a high school. It is highly appreciated by the trainers, coaches and volunteers as being effective and to-the-point (Muskens 2005).

4.2.7 Public communication and information

Dr. Van Eijck, the government's youth commissioner, has outlined the important role of communication and information as instruments for the implementation of plans and tracks for youth care and custody. It needs effective communication strategies that are adapted to the major target groups and their particularities concerning communication and culture. At that level cultural differences are to be taken into account, e.g. with regard to belief systems, languages, attitudes towards the state and the authorities, gender relations, relation between children, young people and adults, the household, human and gender intercourse, etc. Therefore, special

⁹³ Since two years women with children must be available for work. Childcare is to be settled via day care. Social security depends on actions undertaken to find a job or to participate in training.

styles, wordings and languages will be needed, but the message must be the same. Further, it is a professional requirement in youth care and custody that the institutions and their staff are able to communicate effectively with their target groups, taking into consideration cultural differences.

Dr. Tesser referred to a coming initiative of the government to influence public opinion on young Moroccans of the new generation by a special awareness campaign to be launched in spring 2006. Young Moroccans are faced with the worst image in society, and with the worst opportunities for probation places and work. They are easily surpassed on the labour market by new immigrant groups, e.g. from Eastern Europe. The campaign will be based upon role models of successful, integrated Moroccans, who believe in their potentials and perspectives. At the same time the Task Force Youth Unemployment will focus on the best matches between work as available and the capacities of young Moroccans. It will not follow the dead-end street of balancing the possible exaggerated feelings of discrimination on the one hand and preferential treatment or other direct counter-actions against (said) discrimination.

All actions of KIEM, the national knowledge base on integration, should support integration policies and processes, directly or indirectly.

4.3 Short comment on integration perspectives

What will the future be of the political integration debate in the Netherlands since 2001, and will it be pertinent for the future of the country? At short term it will certainly remain on the national political agenda, as a subject that appears to be important enough to win or to lose the national elections of 2007. It was so in 2002 and 2003, and the conservative wings and factions in Dutch politics will try to repeat their winning scenario of those years, with Rita Verdonk as their Iron Lady. Polls and trend watchers of neo-conservative Holland confirmed the attractiveness of the scenario,⁹⁴ whereas a clear standpoint in favour of 'multiculturalism' is still rather suspicious in the eyes of public opinion. Besides, the latent racist undercurrent in the mind of many native Dutch persons cannot be neglected, as it is indicated by the ongoing discrimination of immigrants on the labour market and the white flight from the cities, the schools, or even the country, etc. Counter-action against both discrimination on the labour market and white flight is difficult as it is covered by individual freedom of choice and preference, on the one hand, and by easy denial, on the other. Nobody will admit that he or she intends to discriminate or to fly from 'black' cities and schools. Other candidates showed a better fit for the job, and the new place or school were also much better from a personal perspective.⁹⁵

The other undercurrent of actual politics is that the electorate could be fully tired of immigration and integration issues. Labour and the Socialists have won the local elections of March 2006, and the integration issues played hardly no role in the local election campaign. The Fortuynists, who played the issue hard in Rotterdam, could not win there neither, as they had in 2002.⁹⁶ So, it might be that both left and centre will avoid the issue as much as they can. The consequence could be that a certain level of harshness both in the political rhetoric will be diminished in the election campaigns and that after 2007 a left-centre-green coalition will adjust the immigration and integration rhetoric and measures of the present coalition.

⁹⁴ The polls should prove that there is mobilisable 'Fortuyn-legacy' of fifteen to twenty percent among the Dutch electorate (Calis & Ligtvoet 26-05-2006).

⁹⁵ On 03-06-2006 BN/De Stem and other major regional newspapers published the results of an Internet survey among 1000 people that showed higher scores on racism and discrimination as a public attitude than any survey in the Netherlands before. Ten percent of the respondents referred to them-selves as clear racists, while 25% was very negative on immigrants and 50% had strong feelings against Muslims. The research is done by Motivaction, which has a strong record in qualitative attitude research. However, the methodological background data are not yet available. So it is unclear in how far the outcomes are biased by the Internet survey method, such as the self-selection of respondents and the under-representation of ethnic minorities. But would the outcomes be representative for the Dutch population as a whole or for the native Dutch population they are revealing (Ligtvoet 03-06-2006).

⁹⁶ For the local elections of March 2002 Pim Fortuyn was personally the leader of his formation in Rotterdam. He won and Labour lost, and he formed a coalition with the Christian-Democrats and the conservative Liberals, with 'safety' as the highest priority of the local government. In March 2006 the formation remained a major party in the City Council, but Labour clearly won the elections. The 'Fortuynist' formation refused to join a coalition with Labour.

In the long run fully different political scenarios could emerge. The present integration policies with their emphasis on proficiency in Dutch as a second language and the employability of immigrants could become rather oblique, in relation to factors such as:

1. Lack of proficiency in Dutch as a second language is mostly a first generation problem among Turkish-Dutch, Moroccan-Dutch and Mediterranean-Dutch immigrants. It is defined as a problem in relation to the employability of these and other immigrants. The number of immigrants to whom the problem applies will diminish steadily in the coming period, with the aging of the first generations, their retirement and their decreasing learning capacities. It will become more and more contra-productive to insist on learning them Dutch as well as employable skills.
2. Unemployment of the second generation and others who have employable skill, such as highly educated refugees, is only partly related to proficiency in Dutch, or to having employable skills or other relevant capacities. To a certain extent the second generation is still somewhat 'backward' in school achievements, but unemployment and therefore failed integration are much more related to discrimination on the labour market, ethnic relations in the cities and a variety of cultural factors. It needs a variety of targeted actions and measures to counter-act the problems, beyond the present integration courses and exams.
3. It is becoming clear that immigration will play a decisive role on the labour market of the future. It will certainly need another and much more welcoming attitude towards the immigrants of the future. This will have to be applied towards the immigrant groups that are directly needed, from green house workers via craftsmen and nurses towards brainworkers, and beyond that to all who get access to the country. In relation to that I see a general pardon for all or most present 'old illegals' and a green card system for economic immigrants, preferably in an EU-policy frame, as necessary and unavoidable in the coming years.
4. The aging native generations of baby-boomers and others will have to get accustomed to the mixed demographic make up of their living places, the Dutch cities, the labour market and the professionals they will need, or they have to find refuge in gated white communities such as Sun City in Florida. The coming generation of working people will be mixed, and, to a high extent, life will be multicultural and/or 'urban', whether it is wished or not.

I may assume, however, that the political translation and rhetoric of long-term expectations and tendencies such as these is rather unpredictable.

5 Summary and conclusion

The present report intended to give a meta-assessment of the integration of different immigrants generations in the Netherlands in general and the integration of young and second generation immigrants in particular. Core issues regarded the national integration policies and the integration indicators of that are applied as the national body of knowledge of the integration policies. The meta-assessment as intended has proved to be extremely difficult as national debate and controversy on integration and integration policies has been hard and polarised since 2001, i.e. since 0911, the comet-like rise of the political phenomenon Pim Fortuyn, his assassination just before the elections of May 2002, the paradigm shift in national immigration and integration policies in 2002-2003, the assassination of Theo van Gogh, who had made the movie Submission I with MP Mrs. Ayaan Hirsi Ali in 2004, the likely expatriation of MP Mrs. Ayaan Hirsi Ali in May 2006, and other greater or smaller political incidents as well. For me as the assessment's author it was difficult to keep to scientific principles such as distanced observation, critical analysis and unbiased conclusions, and to avoid to become involved in political comments and debate. I have applied three self-correction mechanisms with the aim to keep to the scientific principles as much as possible, but I know that was impossible to succeed fully in this respect. The self-correction mechanisms were first to start the assessment at the most scientific side, i.e. the assessment of the social indicators paradigm in Dutch immigration and integration research, then followed by the generations issue on which the national controversy and polarisation is rather moderate, to finish with the most controversial and polarised issue, being that of immigration and integration.

As said, however, I could not fully succeed in avoiding involvement in political comments and debate.

With this point in mind I may summarise the conclusions of the present meta-assessment in the following points;

1. In Dutch immigration and integration research a clear social indicators paradigm has been applied. It has, more or less dominated the research field, particularly in policy-oriented research. It has its roots in the social surveys paradigm and it represents predominantly quantitative sociology. The paradigm has been institutionalised in national policy-oriented research since at least twenty years, by the introduction of the fixed and objectified ethnicity indicator in national statistics and by successive annual national integration reports since the early nineties.
2. The ethnicity indicator is based upon the individual registration record of each inhabitant of the country, as managed by the municipalities. It regards a combined indicator based upon the place of birth of the individual and/or his or her parents. A person is defined as a member of an immigrant minority (or as an 'allochtone' in Dutch political rhetoric) when he or she is born in a specific list of non-Western countries, or when one of the parent was born there.
3. The indicator is objectified compared to ethnicity indicators that are based upon self-definition. The indicator is wider than an indicator based upon nationality. Many persons with a Dutch passport belong to an immigrant minority, i.e. all Antillean citizens, many or most persons with a Surinamese or Indonesian background, and the many immigrants who have successfully applied for Dutch citizenship. The indicator is said to be better than the indicators used in most other countries.
4. The ethnicity indicator is also based upon the generation factor. Members of immigrant families remain members of an immigrant minority for the first and second generation, and, maybe, in the future even for the third generation. Therefore, Dutch national statistics and annual integration reports are directly suited for the meta-assessment of 'integration and generations', as for all issues generation breakdowns are available.
5. The ethnicity indicator is part of the national data bases based upon municipal registrations as well as the registration that are linked to that. Besides, the ongoing large-scale national panel survey on labour market participation has been linked to it since the nineties. It formed what I have called the virtual census SSB. In 2005 SSB has been linked to the police registrations, by which linkage figures became available with regard to ethnicity, generations and criminal involvement. In this and other ways the

institutionalised indicators paradigm is extending its scale and scope, and is incorporating the new opportunities that are offered by ICT.

6. At the end of the eighties the indicators paradigm appeared to attain academic leadership too, among others in relation to the nomination of Han Entzinger as a professor in Utrecht. It did not happen. The academic study of immigration and integration became highly diversified, with highest attention for the many cultural factors that play a role in migration and integration processes. In his critical assessment of integration research Prof. Scheffer is observing only a false 'multicultural paradigm' at the universities, whereas another expert complained, not without reason, that the academic attention for relevant survey outcomes is obvious. Several expert referred to other experiences and outcomes of targeted research projects when they were confronted with figures from national statistics and annual integration reports.
7. Those who have a functional relation to national statistics and annual integration reports, i.e. to the indicators paradigm, mentioned a number of wanted improvements, such as the introduction of a third generation indicator, the set-up of the most sophisticated virtual censuses, i.e. linked knowledge bases between registration systems and wide national panel surveys. The virtual censuses are seen as the best alternative for the national censuses that have been abandoned in the Netherlands since 1971. I have not noted further solutions for the most obvious problem related to surveys these days, being the low response in general and the extreme low response among immigrant minorities. The general solution is to work with very large samples that allow for high numbers of replacements and for sophisticated weighting procedures for high and low response groups.
8. The importance of the indicators research as carried out for the assessment of generations and integration is to be doubted, however. Until now the national statistics and the annual integration reports did not show what the chances, opportunities and future of the young and second generation immigrants are. Statistics and reports on the integration of the second generation are an extension of the statistics and the reports on the integration of the first generation, of which a considerable part 'failed' to learn Dutch as a second language and to attain a level of employability as suited for self-sufficiency and usefulness for the national economy. The extended statistics and reports show then that the second generation has made some progress compared to the first generation, but that it remained 'backward' compared to native Dutch young people.
9. Their present outcomes are insufficiently suited for future-oriented conclusions, i.e. conclusion on issues that are raised by interviewed experts in relation to generations and integration. For future-oriented research most experts appeared to need research that if focussed and targeted at specific groups and role models, and, in case, specific impediments for the chances and the opportunities of young and second generation immigrants. In policy-oriented terms it may refer to e.g. targeted surveys, SWOP analyses, research on focus groups, trend watching, ethnographic interviews, and good practice research. In that sense the need appeared to be that of qualitative and targeted research. An issue for further consideration could be whether the many applicable research models will grow apart and will developed within their own logic, or that they might refer to a joint interest in the chances and opportunities of young urban people in general and young urban immigrants in particular. In the frame of a joint interest the indicators paradigm could make a new contribution.
10. Since 2002-2003 the integration policies have gone through an obvious paradigm shift. As a general line of action the government coalitions since then intended to implement clear and restrictive immigration policies, refusing everybody access to the country and expatriating everybody, who had not a legal title of residence. Integration, defined in terms of proficiency in Dutch as a second language and knowledge of national norms and values, was to be proved by examination, with a possible refund of the costs of integration courses on behalf of passed examination. Failure was to be punished by a

fine. Newcomers should prove to have learned basic Dutch and basic norms and values in the country of origin.

11. The harsh immigration practice is immediately introduced, as it could be implemented on the basis of the immigration law of 2001. The Supreme Court has followed the Minister and the government in almost all appeals, arguing that the actions and measures were not in contradiction with the law.
12. Most new integration policies and practices are still in the process of legislation. On many aspects Parliament has still not approved the proposals as some essential legal objections, e.g. in relation to equality for the law and EU rules, are still pending and as failed implementation is feared, e.g. in relation to too high expectations with regard to ICT support. Actually, MP Dijsselbloem stated that at the moment the national investments in integration are lower than before the paradigm shift. With regard to integration the shift is more a matter of political rhetoric than effective practice.
13. Generation issues do not dominate the national debate on integration policies. Some specific sub-issues play and played an obvious role, such the issue of the young, second generation ‘Moroccan’ hangout, the criminal involvement of young, first generation ‘Antilleans’, the practice of marrying an ‘import-bride’ by second generation ‘Moroccans’ and ‘Turks’, and single-motherhood among (very) young ‘black women’. Since recently the issue of the labour market discrimination and probation place discrimination of young and second generation immigrants has got national momentum, in relation to undeniable figures and observations. Only the issue of ‘bride-import’ is directly related to the new integration policies, in the sense that the obligatory integration test in the country of origin was introduced as to counter-act the arrival of ignorant family members.
14. For the near future I expect that the shift will be supported and promoted by certain factions at the right side of the political spectre. They represent the Fortuyn legacy and the paradigm shift of the coalitions since 2002. The present Minister of Immigration and Integration, Mrs. Rita Verdonk, appears to be their natural leader. However, Labour and centre have not much to win with a political emphasis on immigration and integration, as was proved by the recent local elections that showed the comeback of Labour. The campaigns did not focus on immigration and integration.
15. In the long run I do not think that the present restrictive immigration policies and the present focus of integration policies on language proficiency of the first generation will be appropriate. The focus should be on the chances and opportunities of young urban people in general and that of the young and second generation immigrant groups in particular. Policies should be targeted at counter-acting specific impediments against their chances and opportunities, and policy-oriented research should help the policy makers in this frame.
16. Actually, the ideas with regard to this new shift have gained attention already since a longer period, as was stated by several interviewed experts, who are more or less directly faced with the chances and the impediments of urban young people.

6 Recommendations

For the Netherlands the first recommendation is to return to 2001-2002 with regard to the national integration policies. At that moment the country had introduced obligatory integration courses for newcomers and it promoted the participation of further specific target groups among immigrant residents in integration courses. At the local level experience had been build up of how to structure the courses and how to improve their effectiveness. It had led to a set of recommendations of the government's integration task force. Compared to the integration policies of the political coalitions since 2002 it would mean that the idea of integration tests in the country of origin will be abandoned, simply because the chance of failure is too high, and that obligatory integration examination for all immigrant residents will not be effectuated. The newcomers will be obliged to participate in courses that have passed local 'good practice tests' and immigrant residents will be encouraged to participate in these as appropriate.

Pre-condition will be that the integration issue will be disconnected from the political rhetoric of the past four and half year. It would be a major political achievement would the left and the centre achieve to realise this disconnection against the electoral expectation of the conservative liberals and post-Fortuynists with regard to the twenty to thirty percent of the voters, who still would like to win the elections of 2002 again.

Greatest advantage of the disconnection and the return will be that further political and scientific energy could be focussed on other migration issues. From the present meta-assessment I may conclude and recommend that the young and second generations represent such an issue. The issue regards the chances and opportunities of the young and second generation, the necessity of their full participation in an aging society, the more general impediments such as failing secondary and vocational education in combination with labour market discrimination, and the specific alienation of certain groups of young urban people in general and certain young and second generation immigrant groups in particular. It is obvious that integration policies based upon the measures of obligatory integration courses do not solve the problems that arise in relation to the young and second generations. So, policies cannot be and should not be an extension or a branch of the obligatory integration courses. Other strategies and measures are to be set out, and I may recommend that these will become the highest priority of the national integration policies of the coming period.

At the moment the institutionalised and policy-oriented research on integration indicators is dealing with generations and integration as an extension of the successful or failed integration of the first generation. National statistics and annual integration reports have been structured to measure successful or failed integration of the first generations appropriately, and to control the integration as achieved for generation and age interaction effects. In that sense the national statistics and annual integration reports could show and showed that the young second generation made considerable progress compared to the first generation, but that they remained 'backward' compared to young native persons, on the average.

As a model for policy-oriented research on the chances and opportunities of the young and second generations and all issues related to that, this frame of the national statistics and annual integration reports is insufficient. At the moment certain targeted research projects and frames are apparently much more appropriate for policy making, as are research projects into institutional impediments e.g. at schools and on the labour market or those on urban cultural group processes. So, a further recommendation should be that policy makers take the finding into consideration of the many and targeted research projects on institutional and cultural factors. It regards a recommendation with a certain reservation, as the relevant field of research is very scattered over academic groups and applied research centres. The overview is very difficult for those involved in policy making and public debate.

The institutionalised backbone of indicators research in the Netherlands, i.e. the national statistics and the annual integration report could become a mediator between scattered but relevant research at the one hand, and the policy makers, on the other. SCP, CBS and other government related research institutes could be charged to produce periodical meta-assessments of the young and second immigrant generations, taking into consideration

all relevant publications and ongoing research projects of the time. So, the recommendation is that for the coming period the focus will not longer be on more and further national ethnicity statistics and annual integration reports based on wide surveys and virtual censuses. The recommendation is a new priority on comprehensive meta-studies of all relevant targeted surveys, SWOP analyses, research on focus groups, trend watching, ethnographic interviews, etc., as well as national statistics as available.

The recommendation is to be extended to the European level. Chances and opportunities of the young and second generation are more and more embedded in European or even global trends and policies. The present INTI study is, together with the ongoing TIES project, a first attempt at the comparative assessment of the integration of young and second generation immigrants. Recommendation must be that these projects are followed up by further national meta-assessments of the young and second generations as well as comprehensive and comparative European research projects on the chances and opportunities of the new and young generations.

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